I. Intro

II. Reading review: Koremenos, et al.: types of international institutions states create depend on what kind of problem they face
   A. Introduction to variables, IVs, and DVs
   B. 5 key DEPENDENT variables of institutional variation:
      1. Membership rules;
      2. Scope of issues covered;
      3. Degree of centralization;
      4. Rules for controlling institution; and
      5. Flexibility of arrangements
   C. 4 key INdependent variables that influence values of DEPENDENT variables from Koremenos et al. plus my 2 addns (norms and broader context)
      1. Distribution (from game theory literature): Prediction: theory expects that the more distributional questions are in play, the HARDER the problem will be to resolve
      2. Enforcement (from game theory literature): Prediction: theory expects that the more enforcement matters, the HARDER the problem will be to resolve
      3. Number of actors (and asymmetries in size and interests among them) involved in the problem (from collective action literature)
      4. Uncertainty about (from economics of uncertainty literature): Behavior, State of world, Preferences
      5. Norms
      6. Broader context

III. Two logics by which states make choices about behavior
   A. Logic of consequences: Calculate benefits/costs, with variation in what costs and benefits are counted
      1. Independent self-interest (narrowly defined)
      2. Independent self-interest (broadly defined)
      3. Interdependent self-interest
   B. Logic of appropriateness: Norms and roles: two different pathways and mechanisms -
      1. Regimes alter sense of what right thing is to do, and actors change their behavior in response. Little calculation of interests - other behaviors not even considered
      2. Behavior perceived as way to achieve a particular “social identity”, i.e., to be perceived by others as a certain “type” of actor, e.g., “liberal economy,” “green” state, avoid being “rogue” or pariah state

IV. Problem structure -- intro
   A. What is problem structure? The features of the problem that influence:
      1. Whether it’s harder or easier to solve the problem? Institutional formation
      2. What kind of solution states arrive at? Institutional design
      3. How effective the solution is? Institutional influence/effectiveness
   B. Young argues hard to devise a single scale of hard to easy but, instead, need to consider various features of problem (Young, 1999, 51). Also notes that what makes a problem difficult to negotiate a solution to may differ from what makes a problem difficult in terms of influence, compliance, or enforcement.
   C. No need for single dimension but want to think about different problem features and their implications

V. Aspects of problem structure – key questions we can ask to determine elements of problem structure
   A. Different problem structures produce different types of international institutions to resolve the problem. “Different cooperation problems lead us to expect different solutions” [Martin, 1992 #1964, 782].
   B. Question 1 – conflict/harmony/cooperation?: Does at least one country believe that other countries’ behaviors harm their interests?
      1. If not, there is no problem that needs addressing -- this is HARMONY - nonproblem Examples:
         a) Countries’ policies regarding what form of democratic government they have
         b) Countries’ policies regarding how to educate their citizens
         c) Countries’ policies regarding house construction methods and building and zoning rules
      2. If so, there is some form of “conflict” due to negative EXTERNALITY (i.e., one state engages in a behavior that has external effects on other states). Externalities can be either positive or negative.
3. If there is conflict, is either side willing to act to mitigate it? If not, first problem type is **Deadlock** (Pure Conflict) problem. Conflict arises because each actor seeks to “maximize difference between their own returns and those of others” rather than “maximizing own gains” (Stein, 1982, 318).

4. Integrative bargaining: Should we create a bigger pie? What type of bigger pie should we create? How do we create a bigger pie?

5. Distributive bargaining: Who should contribute ingredients for the pie? Once we make the pie bigger, who should get the additional parts of the pie we create?

6. For a problem to be resolvable, countries must be in absolute gains (will I have more pie than I currently do?) rather than relative gains (will I have more pie than the other guy?),
   a) Territorial disputes. Both sides prefer keeping fighting (because believe will win) to stopping fighting. Both sides would prefer other surrender but won’t give enough for that to happen.

**C. Question 2 – Actors: Who is involved?** What actors are causing or affected by the problem? Who needs to be or could be brought in as relevant actors to fix the problem?

1. Koremenos “Number” Prediction: More actors usually considered to make it HARDER to reach agreement

2. What roles do actors have?
   a) Perpetrator (fishing countries, upstream polluting state)
   b) Victim (other fishing countries, downstream states)
   c) Vested interests (US in Middle East)
   d) Could be interested (debt for nature swaps)
   e) Uninterestable (landlocked African states and whaling)

3. Types of actors -- contrast problems of governments vs. those of substate actors
   a) Nuclear proliferation, trade, civil and political human rights are due to actions by governments
   b) Economic, social and cultural rights are often due to non-government actors
   c) Much pollution and much health care done by non-government actors
   d) Differences in whose behavior must be controlled and relationship between governments who are creating institutions and actors whose behavior must be changed by those institutions.
   e) Prediction: Theory unclear about how type of actor influences difficulty of resolution

**D. Question 3 – Capacities/Power:** Do countries “causing the problem” have opportunities and capacity to engage in “good” behavior?

1. If not, then we have another form of problem: a **Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity** problem. Remember that, in all these cases, there is only an international problem if some other country believes that the behavior of the country “causing the problem” influences its well-being.

2. Examples:
   a) Ability to protect nuclear weapons from accidental detonation -- newer nuclear powers do not have technology in place to protect nuclear weapons from accidents. It is in the interest of both countries with weapons and those without that they have such technology.
   b) Ability to reduce AIDS infection rates in developing countries -- many countries lack capacity to provide effective anti-AIDS drugs. In interests of all countries to control AIDS.
   c) Ability of small countries to defend themselves from attack. It was in the interests of European states and the US to protect Europe from attack from the Soviet Union.

3. NOTE: behavior of state causing problem does not result from EITHER logic of consequences or a logic of appropriateness. It does not even involve a choice. The state’s failure to engage in a good behavior reflects simply the fact that it can NOT do so, rather than that it chooses not to do so.

**E. Question 4 – Incentives/PREFERENCES:** How do material consequences for the countries “causing the problem” depend on the behavior of other countries? 3 main possibilities (see Stein on Collab v. Coord)

1. Upstream/Downstream Problem: Consequences for perpetrators do not depend on other countries.
   Country R would be unaffected (Country R’s behavior affects Country C but not vice versa).
   a) Human rights abuses -- a country that is abusing its citizen’s human rights generally is indifferent to what human rights abuses may be occurring in other countries
   b) Pollution by upriver or upwind state or simply by any state that contributes to a problem but is not concerned about that problem (e.g., OPEC with respect to climate change)
   c) Similar to Rittberger/Zürn’s **Rambo Problem.** One country has control over an issue and other country has no ability to influence its behavior. In these cases, country that dislikess behavior may have to bring other power resources to bear on the state engaged in the bad behavior.
2. **Coordination Problem:** Consequences for perpetrators are BETTER from engaging in good behavior if other countries do: Country R benefits if Country C complies and, if Country C does comply, then R only harms itself by not complying. Krasner: major problem here is distribution.
   a) Universal language for international air traffic control
   b) Satellite slot allocation and radio wave allocation
   c) Any sort of standard-setting, e.g., with computer communications
   d) Corresponds to Rittberger/Zürn (“Tubingen group” in Young) “conflicts over means”
   e) Variant of this problem is a **Susion Problem,** in which one country is more powerful and wants to engage in good behavior independent of other countries do and coerces others to also.
      (1) Bretton Woods agreements and US covering most costs of supporting free trade
      (2) “Burden sharing” with respect to costs of protecting western Europe from Soviet threat
      (3) Removal of nuclear weapons from post-Soviet or Chernobyl cleanup

3. **Collaboration Problems:** Consequences for perpetrators are WORSE from engaging in good behavior if other countries do so: Country R would benefit if Country C complies BUT R benefits even more if it can get country C to engage in the good behavior while Country R does not.
   a) Arms races of any sort, nuclear, biological, chemical.
   b) Trade wars.
   c) Overfishing.

4. All these issues involve logic of consequences calculations by states involved. Countries calculate what is in their interests by looking at benefits - costs of bad compared to good behavior.

5. **Question 5 -- Information/Knowledge:** Are their unknown effects of behaviors for those “causing the problem” that, if they knew, would make them stop engaging in bad behavior, regardless of what others do? Perpetrating country’s behavior causes problems for others but also for itself which they are unaware of and which, if they knew about them, would cause them to stop the bad behavior.
   1. Correspond to UNCERTAINTY variables of Koremenos et al.
   2. Uncertainty about behavior
      a) Two questions:
         (1) Can country being harmed easily tell what the perpetrators are doing?
         (2) Does technology offer promise as a way to overcome these problems or does determining what others are doing inherently depend on their cooperation in telling you?
      b) Arms races and many military issues -- very unclear what other states are doing.
      c) Trade - tariffs and quotas are transparent, NTBs are not
      d) Human rights -- very unclear what state is doing and technology is unlikely to be helpful.
      e) Corruption -- can’t get perfect info but can get perceived info (Transparency International)
      f) **Prediction:** usually theory expects that such uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

3. Uncertainty about the “state of the world”
   a) What are the consequences of actions taken individually or collectively? These relate to issues of Epistemic/Knowledge Problems discussed previously in class.
   b) Scientific knowledge is often in play here.
   c) Examples: environmental problems, especially newly discovered ones, have high levels of uncertainty about consequences of behaviors actors are engaged in. Implication that this may be part of solution. Also, uncertainty about health problems like avian flu. By contrast, trade or arms control have fewer cases where consequences of behavior are not known.
   d) **Prediction:** usually theory expects that such uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

4. Uncertainty about preferences of other actors
   a) These relate to issues regarding assurance games -- what do other states want to accomplish?
   b) Are states more committed to meeting international commitments or to playing domestic politics? Italy had to prove itself with respect to ability to control monetary policy to enter EU, but did NOT have to prove itself with respect to human rights issues.
   c) **Prediction:** usually theory expects that such uncertainty makes problems HARDER to resolve

5. Uncertainty about consequences of one’s behavior.
   a) Problem of acid rain in Europe, prior to knowledge of its consequences:
   b) Trade wars. Beggar-thy-neighbor policies. States thought imposing high tariffs to block imports would increase domestic output but actually harmed them.
   c) Quarantine regulations that Stein (1982, 321) talks about. Actions based on political bases rather than scientific ones (e.g., Italians quarantine Greeks rather than those with cholera).
VI. Conclusion

A. Eight key questions

B. Broader context

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