I. Hypotheses regarding institutional effectiveness

II. Reasons for inst'l effectiveness and lack of effectiveness
   A. Influence and compliance arise because:
      1. **Managerial view**: Sanctions and enforcement often aren’t needed, even for “deep” cooperation
      2. **Enforcement position 1**: States only agree to “shallow” cooperation, so sanctions aren’t needed
      3. **Enforcement position 2**: States will only accept “deep” cooperation in combination with strong sanctions
   B. Lack of influence and noncompliance because:
      1. **Intention** or Tallberg’s “preference-driven violations”
      2. **Incapacity** or Tallberg’s “capacity-driven violations”
      3. Inadvertence

III. Findings of Brown Weiss and Jacobson
   A. Problem structure: “Characteristics of activity involved”
      1. Fewer actors – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 521}.
      2. Economic incentives foster (rather than hinder) regulation – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 521}.
      3. Multinationals play big role in activity – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 522}.
      4. Concentration of activity in major countries – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 523}.
   B. Institutional features: “Characteristics of the accord”
      1. Perceived equity of obligations – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 528}.
      2. Specificity of obligations – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 528}.
      4. Self-reporting requirements – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 528}.
      5. Monitoring beyond reporting – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 528}.
      6. Effective secretariat – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 528}.
      7. Incentives and/or sanctions; some type of response mechanism – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 528}.
   C. Context: “International environment”
      1. More salience from international conferences, media – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 530}.
      2. NGO activism on issue – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 530}.
      3. Number of parties involved – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 530}.
      4. Interplay with other institutions, including international financial institutions – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 530}.
   D. Country variables: Factors involving country: These are factors that explain variation between countries, i.e., why some countries are influence by an international institution while others are not

IV. Effectiveness variation due to **Problem Structure**
   1. Institutions facing HARDER problems are likely to be less effective
   2. Easy group:
      a) **COORDINATION** problems – should be quite effective
         (1) Big effect but not particularly impressive
         (2) “Shallow cooperation” in Downs, Rocke, Barsoom’s terminology
      b) **EPISTEMIC** problems: pooling resources but they are informational resources that are relatively cheap AND are in the interests of states to pool
         (1) Also shallow cooperation
   3. Medium group:
      a) **UPSTREAM/DOWNSTREAM** problems: hard to resolve in advance but structure likely to lead to carefully established rules, that make it more likely to succeed
      b) **POSITIVE EXTERNALITY PLAGUED BY INCAPACITY**: again, structure makes structuring of solution very carefully done and, once arrived at, likely to be “incentive-compatible”
   4. Hard group:
a) COLLABORATION problems: challenging but everyone has some incentives to contribute but ALSO incentives to cheat
b) NORMATIVE problems: changing norms is likely to be very hard

B. Inherent transparency variation
1. LESS inherent transparency, more likely institution will NOT be effective
2. Logic: the easier it is to get away with a violation, the more likely states will actually try to do so AND the more likely it is that states will worry about that and therefore not change their behavior because of lack of trust.

C. Response incentives
1. Violation tolerance: LESS violation tolerance, more likely institution WILL be effective. If not violation tolerant, then considerable vigilance and more likely to have all sorts of systems to ensure violations are detected and responded to
2. STRONGER response incentives, more likely institution WILL be effective
3. Logic: more incentives to respond, more likely actors who would otherwise cheat are deterred from doing so AND more likely that, if deterrence fails, some response will occur

V. Effectiveness variation due to Institutional Design
A. Institutional type:
1. Procedural and programmatic institutions – MOST likely to be effective
   a) Logic: can be most flexible and responsive (see Kucik and Reinhardt article on how flexibility seems to help, even more than expected)
2. Regulatory: Depends considerably on other aspects of institution (see Brown-Weiss and Jacobson articles)
3. Generative: LEAST likely to be effective
   a) Logic: in response to hardest problem type AND least likely to have institutional design features that can force change.
B. Membership: more states involved, LESS likely to be influential
C. Primary rule system
1. Specificity: MORE specific rules lead to MORE effective institutions
2. Common/Differentiated: Brown Weiss and Jacobson say it’s not common vs. differentiated but perceived equity of rules. So, it depends on relationship of rules to the behavior causing the problem
D. Information systems: Clearer and more specific information systems lead to MORE effective institutions
E. Response systems:
1. Facilitative institutions more likely than enforcement systems: Divergent hypotheses – enforcement vs. management school
2. More clear and specific responses, of whatever type, lead to MORE effective institutions

VI. Another way of thinking about sources of compliance in face of incentives for non-compliance
A. Altering consequences
1. Deterrence: increase expected costs of violation
2. Remuneration: increase expected benefits of compliance
B. Altering opportunities
1. Generative: create new opportunities to comply – increase capacities
2. Preclusive: remove opportunities to violate – decrease capacities
C. Altering perceptions
1. Cognitive: provide new information (on behavior or consequences) that changes perception of best choice
2. Normative: create new norms and identities with corresponding social pressure, e.g., human rights or relate to meta-norms of "law abiding" behavior, e.g., rules of war

VII. Example: Syria – have international institutions made a difference?
A. On the pro side:
2. Creates pressure on others to respond as they said they would, with inspectors (Alex Bryans)
3. Strengthens a general norm: “international organizations can have an impact on how a country acts according to rules shared amongst most of the world” (Alex Bryans)
4. “Syria has submitted its report of chemical weapons through an international organization” (Zack Gripenstraw)
5. “There is a strong norm, supported by the Geneva Protocol (1925), prohibiting chemical weapons in warfare. Obama stated once the chemical attacks were confirmed that the U.S is responsible to hold Syria responsible” (Zack Gripenstraw)

6. “U.S. opinion regarding the case against Syria was strengthened as a result of the U.N. report on the matter” (Greg Mina)

7. “Syria sent the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) a declaration outlining its weapons program” (Greg Mina)

8. “countries that were divided on the actions that needed to be taken in response to Syria’s chemical weapons usage have come together to adopt a resolution” (Jessica Neafie)

9. “team of inspectors sent into Syria: if the International Organization did not exist, and without the norm that chemical weapons are extremely dangerous and bad to use in warfare, there would be almost no push to solve the issue” (Emily Gaudin)

10. “accepted norm provided the impetus for a breakthrough” (Sam Sun)

11. “Even though they could go ahead and do whatever they pleased, based on their military strength, they do not” (Joe Sawtelle)

12. “Through the U.N., Russia’s disagreement becomes very public to the rest of the world and as international support for action gains momentum Russia was forced to seek a solution” (Will Smith)

13. “OPCW serves to distance itself from the revolution and civil war violence and merely extract the dangerous weapons being used against Syrian civilians” (Chris Torgeson)

14. “U.N. officials explain how they have to negotiate dozens of government and opposition checkpoints before aid is allowed into Syria” (Javiera Wood)

B. On the con side:

1. “Obama stated that the U.S. would do whatever it needed to in order to protect its individual interests. Power matters in this case” (Alexandra Moreno)

2. “largely we have seen states attempting to act unilaterally and in their interests” (Evan Horne)

3. “article shows the concerns Russia has and why it is in their best short term interest to work with the Assad government in Syria” (Neal Killion)

4. “chemical weapons situation would not have even happened if Syria had any care for the international community” (James Hadid)

5. “certain states have no qualms with unilateral action” (Alex Murphy)

6. “actions of both great powers, Russia on one side and the United States on the other, are significantly shaped by their national interests in Middle East” (Sam Sun)

7. “US has made it clear that it intends to work alone” (Inessa Wurscher)

C. Tweeners

1. “The majority of the solutions being put forth now have happened outside of international organizations like the United Nations, yet they are using the international organizations to provide inspectors and the experts to dismantle the chemical weapons” (Neal Killion)

2. “After attacks on civilians in Damascus, there was the immediate possibility that the United States and its allies would respond with cooperative and/or unilateral military action” but then this was delayed in response to UN discussions (Alex Murphy)

3. “has been used as a secondary tool to both justify unilateral action by some states and pressure others into pursuing collective actions” (Shawna Meechan)

4. “While the US has agreed to go along with Russia’s plan publically, the US is still continuing its original plan as well” (Inessa Wurscher)

VIII. GATT / WTO effectiveness

A. Analysis of GATT influence

B. Two levels of influence ==

1. Tariff levels
2. Economic growth

C. Simple question: does it look like there is something that needs explanation?

IX. Conclusions

A. How do we evaluate the effects of a treaty on behavior?

B. How do we account for differences in problem structure?

C. How do we account for differences in regime design and features?
D. This is a lot to cover in a short time but provides a background for thinking about how to do the analysis of this course.