

PS420/520: International Organization

Ronald Mitchell

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Time: T-Th 10:00-11:20	Office Hours: PLC-921 on Tues/Thurs 11:30-1:00, by signup and appt.
Course Website on Canvas	rmitchel@uoregon.edu ; Phone: 346-4880

COURSE DESCRIPTION

In this course, we will answer three main questions:

- What types of *problems* do governments have to overcome in the international realm? How does the structure of these problems influence how hard they are to resolve?
- What sorts of *solutions* do governments devise to address those problems? What factors determine which solutions are successfully negotiated and which are rejected?
- What determines why some of those solutions are *effective* and some are not? How can we accurately *assess* the effectiveness of international institutions at influencing state behavior?

We will examine these questions by studying international security, trade, human rights, and environment. We will discuss the roles that non-state actors, information, and norms play in international relations. It is NOT a course describing the United Nations system or the bureaucratic structure of other international bureaucracies. It is a course on the “organization” of the international system rather than on international organizations. The course will study theories that explain why states succeed or fail at creating institutions for international governance and theories of which institutions are effective and under what conditions. You will develop a theoretical perspective on these questions and learn to evaluate trends across issue areas, with the goal of improving your ability to analyze how well theories do at explaining particular patterns of facts (rather than simply learning the facts themselves).

REQUIRED TEXTS AND I-CLICKER

The reading load is quite heavy in this class. Readings will be on the course Canvas site. Although the class is large, I try to make discussion a valuable part of most class sessions. Having done the reading will be essential to classes being interesting and enlightening.

- Young, Oran R. 1999. *Governance in world affairs*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Online readings: all readings besides Young are on Canvas and are designated as *Online Reading*.
- For required quizzes, you will need to have an I>clicker. You can buy/use your own, borrow one from a friend, or buy an I>clicker app for your smartphone. Instructions will be available on the Canvas site.
- Daily reading of the *New York Times* is encouraged. Read online, in the library or check the UO Bookstore.

EXPECTED LEARNING OUTCOMES

- Understand how the political structure of international problems varies across the issues of security, trade, human rights, and environment. Recognize the ways in which the power and incentives that lead states to engage in behaviors that cause collective problems make some problems harder to resolve than others.
- Recognize the relationship between problem structure characteristics and the design of the international institutions that states create. Understand why certain design features will never be used to address certain types of problems. Know the difference between regulatory, procedural, programmatic, and generative regimes, when they are likely to be adopted, and the different core elements of any international institution.
- Be able to assess whether an international institution has influenced state behavior and identify the key factors that make it more or less likely that an international institution will succeed in doing so.
- Demonstrate critical thinking and communication skills, including the use of counterfactuals, through midterms and a final exam. Show the ability to using empirical evidence to assess theoretical claims about the design and effectiveness of international institutions.

ESTIMATED STUDENT WORKLOAD / HOW GRADES WILL BE DETERMINED

Student workload involves 120 hours for this 4-credit course. Time and percent for components are detailed below.

Class element	Percentage	Hours
Class attendance and participation	5%	30
Reading <i>Grad students only: 5 “Additional readings” (see end of syllabus)</i>	0%	30
Plagiarism assignment: required but no points: Read Canvas assignment and my plagiarism policy (below), Come in with questions.	0%	1

Two quizzes: quizzes will end at 10:10 sharp. See dates below.	5% each (10% total)	2 each (prep) (4 total)
Two in-class midterms: See dates below.	25% each (50% total)	13 each (prep) (26 total)
Take-home final: due via Canvas no later than 8am on day states on UO final exam schedule. <i>Grad students only: 25 page research paper instead (see below)</i>	35%	29

Graduate student research paper (instead of final): 25 pages / 35% of grade

Grade includes and will reflect 2 draft papers (on deadlines noted in syllabus). Drafts will receive feedback and “shadow” grades that will not be part of your final grade but will let you know where you stand. Your research paper must carefully and rigorously evaluate a particular area of international cooperation/institutions and see whether theories developed in the course can explain EITHER a) the formation of that institution and its institutional design, b) the effects of that institution, or c) some similar topic approved by the professor. The paper must include a thoughtful and theoretical literature review that includes citations to *at least 15 references* as well as a careful delineation of specific hypotheses and their evaluation against the empirical evidence collected for the case. *First draft:* 5-10 pages that lay out your research question, including at least 5 citations to references *not from the course*. *Second draft:* 7-15 pages that demonstrates clear progress in developing a lit review and a start toward applying that lit review to the issue/institution that you will analyze with your theory. *Final paper:* must be of a quality similar to a first draft of a Masters thesis. More details available via the Course Website or come talk to me.

Assignment of final grades

Students will receive grades based on the following criteria:

- A+: if given at all, given to 1 or 2 students whose performance stood out as significantly stronger than all other students in the course
- A: all assignments completed in ways that demonstrate a particularly strong and nuanced understanding of almost all course concepts and the ability to clearly connect theories from the course to empirical evidence
- B: all assignments completed in ways that demonstrate solid understanding of most course concepts and the ability to adequately connect theories from the course to empirical evidence
- C: completed assignments demonstrate only a basic understanding of course concepts and/or one or more assignments missing
- D: missing many assignments and completed assignments demonstrate little understanding of material covered
- F: assignments completed account for less than 80% of total grade.

Expected distribution of grades: ~20% As, ~35% Bs, ~35% Cs, ~7% Ds, ~3% Fs.

COURSE POLICIES

Late assignments

Late assignments will lose 2 points per day (at midnight): an assignment that arrives before midnight of the 1st day after it was due will lose 2 of 100 points, one that arrives midnight of the 2nd day after it was due will lose 4 of 100 points, etc. Please turn in all assignments, even if late, however.

NOTE: It is difficult to pass this course unless you turn in ALL assignments, since each is such a large portion of the final grade. Help me help you pass the course by turning in all assignments on time.

Grade complaints

I am happy to review contested grades. If you would like me to review an assignment, please let me know within one week of receiving the grade.

Academic Integrity, Plagiarism, Fabrication, Cheating, and Misconduct:

By enrolling in this course, you agree to abide by the University’s Student Conduct Code. You must read the three webpages linked on Canvas for Assignment #1. Understanding these documents is a course REQUIREMENT that you MUST complete by the end of week 1. Everything in your assignments must be your own work. Neither ignorance of these policies nor the lack of an intention to cheat or plagiarize will be considered a legitimate defense. Raise questions you have with the professor before problems arise. I will flunk all students who plagiarize and will report them to University authorities. Unfortunately, I have done so two or three times in the past few years.

Creating an environment conducive to learning

Both I as a professor and the University of Oregon are committed to creating inclusive learning environments. Please notify me if any aspects of my instruction methods or course design result in barriers to your participation. If you have a disability, I encourage you to contact Accessible Education Center in 164 Oregon Hall at 346-1155 or uoaec@uoregon.edu If you have already been in contact with Accessible Education Center and have a notification

letter, please provide me with a statement from Accessible Education Center during the first week of class so that we can make appropriate arrangements. University policy requires that students present a notification letter from AEC to receive testing accommodations (see <http://aec.uoregon.edu/students/current.html>).

I also have a personal commitments and university responsibility to report any instances of sexual harassment, sexual violence and/or other forms of prohibited discrimination. If you would rather share information about sexual harassment, sexual violence or discrimination to a confidential employee who does not have this reporting responsibility, you can find a list of those individuals at <https://safe.uoregon.edu/services>. Each resource is clearly labeled as either “required reporter,” “confidential UO employee,” or “off-campus,” to allow you to select your desired level of confidentiality.

PS 420/520: International Organization

Introduction

Tues., Week 1: Introduction:

No readings. First day of class

Thurs., Week 1: International Organization: an introduction

Assignment 0 "Plagiarism" due by end of week 1: Complete online readings regarding plagiarism!

- Young, Ch. 1
- Shanks, C., et al. 1996. Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations: 1981-1992. *International Organization* 50(4): 593-627.
- Krasner, S. D. 1982. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization* 36(1): 185-205.

Differences in the Structure of International Problems

Tues., Week 2: Problem Structure Theory: Part 1

- Young, Ch. 3
- Koremenos, B., et al. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization* 55(4): 761-799. *Read whole article but focus on INdependent Variables section: 773-780.*
- Stein, A. A. 1982. Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world. *International Organization* 36(2): 299-324.

Thurs., Week 2: Problem Structure Theory: Part 2

Quiz #1 at beginning of class – quiz will end at 10:10 for all students, even those who show up late.

- Rittberger, V. and M. Zürn. 1990. Towards regulated anarchy in East-West relations: causes and consequences of East-West regimes. *International regimes in East-West politics*, edited by V. Rittberger: 9-63. London: Pinter. Read only 29-46.
- Underdal, A. 2002. One question, two answers. *Environmental regime effectiveness: confronting theory with evidence*, edited by E. L. Miles, A. Underdal, S. Andresen, J. Wettestad, J. B. Skjærseth and E. M. Carlin: 3-45. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Read only 15-23.

Tues., Week 3: Problem Structure: International Political Economy

- Milner, H. 2013. International trade. *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons: 720-745. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Thurs., Week 3: Problem Structure: Security

- Müller, H. 2013. Security cooperation. *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons: 607-634. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Tues., Week 4: Problem Structure: Human Rights and Environment

- Schmitz, H. P. and K. Sikkink. 2013. International human rights. *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons: 827-851. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Mitchell, R. B. 2010. International politics and the environment (ch. 2). London: Sage Publications

Thurs., Week 4: Midterm Exam #1

Midterm Exam #1 in class

The Formation and Design of International Institutions

Tues., Week 5: Institutional Formation Theory: Part 1

- Young, Ch. 2
- Young, O. R. and G. Osherenko. 1993. Testing theories of regime formation: findings from a large collaborative research project. *Regime theory and international relations*, edited by V. Rittberger: 223-251. New York: Oxford University Press. Read only 223-238.
- Koremenos, B., C. Lipson and D. Snidal. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization* 55(4): 761-799. *RE-read whole article but focus on DEpendent Variables section (768-773) AND Conjectures section (780-796).*

Thurs., Week 5: Institutional Formation Theory (Part 2) and Security

Grad students only: 1st draft of paper: 5-10 pages that lay out your research question, including at least 5 citations to references not from the course due on October 30.

- Koremenos, B., et al. 2001. Rational design: looking back to move forward. *International Organization* 55(4): 1051-1082.
- Hemmer, C. and P. J. Katzenstein. 2002. Why is there no NATO in Asia? collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism. *International Organization* 56(3): 575-607.

Tues., Week 6: Institutional Formation: Trade and the European Union
(Guest lecture by Prof. Craig Parsons, UO Dept of Political Science)

Quiz #2 at beginning of class – quiz will end at 10:10 for all students, even those who show up late.

- Kucik, J. and E. Reinhardt. 2008. Does flexibility promote cooperation? an application to the global trade regime. *International Organization* 62: 477-505.
- Parsons, C. 2010. Revisiting the Single European Act. *Comparative Political Studies* 43(6): 706-734.
- Garrett, G. 1992. International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal market. *International Organization* 46(2): 533-60.

Thurs., Week 6: Institutional Formation: Human Rights and Environment

- Carpenter, R. C. 2007. Setting the advocacy agenda: theorizing issue emergence and nonemergence in transnational advocacy networks. *International Studies Quarterly* 51(1): 99-120.
- Mitchell, R. B. and P. Keilbach. 2001. Reciprocity, coercion, or exchange: symmetry, asymmetry and power in institutional design. *International Organization* 55(4): 891-917.

Tues., Week 7: Midterm Exam #2

Midterm Exam #2

The Effects and Effectiveness of International Institutions

Thurs., Week 7: Institutional Effectiveness Theory

- Young, Ch. 4 AND Ch. 5
- Mitchell, R. B. 2010. International politics and the environment (ch. 6). London: Sage Publications
- Jacobson, H. K. and E. Brown Weiss. 1998. Assessing the record and designing strategies to engage countries. *Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*, edited by E. Brown Weiss and H. K. Jacobson: 511-554. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Tues., Week 8: Institutional Effectiveness: Security and Trade

Grad students only: 2nd draft of paper: 7-15 pages that demonstrate clear progress in providing a developed lit review and the beginnings of the application of that lit review to the case or cases of institutions that you plan to analyze with your theory.

- **Syria's Chemical Weapons:** Read the following websites and think about the influence of international institutions on Syria's destruction of its chemical weapons
 - Various. 2014. Destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. *Wikipedia*. 20 August 2014 (accessed: 1 September 2014)
 - U.S. Department of State. 2014. Framework for elimination of Syrian chemical weapons. *U.S. Department of State*. 14 September 2013 (accessed: 1 September 2014)
 - Rappeport, A. 2014. Syria's chemical arsenal fully destroyed, U.S. says. *New York Times*. 1 September 2014 (accessed: 18 August 2014)
- Goldstein, J. L., et al. 2007. Institutions in international relations: understanding the effects of the GATT and the WTO on world trade. *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67. Read only 37-47 and 63-64.

Thurs., Week 8: Institutional Effectiveness: Human Rights and Migration

- Lahav, G. and S. Lavenex. 2013. International migration. *Handbook of International Relations, 2nd ed.*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons: 746-774. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Neumayer, E. 2005. Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(6): 925-953.

Tues., Week 9: Institutional Effectiveness: Environment

- Bernauer, T. and T. Siegfried. 2008. On cooperation, compliance and performance in international water management, with an empirical application to the Syr Darya basin. *Global Governance* 14(4): 479-501.

Thurs., Week 9:

Thanksgiving Break -- No Class

Conclusions

Tues., Week 10: Institutional Effectiveness: Review

- Young, Ch. 6 AND 7

Thurs., Week 10: Review of Class Theory and Substance and “The Future of Global Governance”

- Young, Ch. 8
- Review all previous class readings and come to class with questions

Undergraduates Take-Home Final Exam

Submit via Canvas no later than day designated on University final exam schedule.

Graduate Student Final Paper

Due no later than day designated on University final exam schedule.

ADDITIONAL OPTIONAL READINGS

Below are additional readings that I have not assigned for the class but that interested students may want to read. They also provide a place for graduate students to start (and include in) their research. Also, ANY articles in the journals: *International Organization*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *World Politics*, or *International Studies Perspectives* are great places to start doing further research on international organization and the topics covered in this course. These are NOT available online (despite below) but are available via <http://libweb.uoregon.edu/>

- Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3-32 (read pages 3-23 only).
- Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal. 2000. Hard and soft law in international governance. *International Organization* 54(3): 421-456.
- Allee, T. L. and C. Peinhardt. 2011. Contingent credibility: the impact of investment treaty violations on foreign direct investment. *International Organization* 65(3): 401-432.
- Allee, T. L. and J. E. Scalera. 2012. The divergent effects of joining international organizations: trade gains and the rigors of WTO accession. *International Organization* 66(2): 243-276.
- Alter, K. J. 1998. Who are the "masters of the treaty?" European governments and the European Court of Justice. *International Organization* 52(1): 121-147.
- Barnett, M. N. and M. Finnemore. 1999. The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization* 53(4): 699-732.
- Bernauer, T. 2002. Explaining success and failure in international river management. *Aquatic Sciences* 64(1): 1-19.
- Carpenter, C., et al. 2014. Explaining the advocacy agenda: insights from the human security network. *International Organization* 68(02): 449-470.
- Cao, X. and A. Prakash. 2010. Trade competition and domestic pollution: a panel study, 1980-2003. *International Organization* 64(3): 481-503.
- Dai, X. 2005. Why comply? the domestic constituency mechanism. *International Organization* 59(2): 363-398. Read only 363-366 and 374-389.
- Donno, D. 2010. Who is punished? Regional intergovernmental organizations and the enforcement of democratic norms. *International Organization* 64(4): 593-626.
- Efrat, A. 2010. Toward internationally regulated goods: controlling the trade in small arms and light weapons. *International Organization* 64(1): 97-131.
- Gilligan, M. J. 2004. Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international multilateral agreements? *International Organization* 58(3): 459-484.
- Goldstein, J. L., D. Rivers and M. Tomz. 2007. Institutions in international relations: understanding the effects of the GATT and the WTO on world trade. *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67. Read only 37-47 and 63-64.
- Grieco, J. M. 1995. The Maastricht Treaty, economic and monetary union and the neo-realist research programme. *Review of International Studies* 21(1): 21-40.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., et al. 2011. Emergency and escape: explaining derogations from human rights treaties. *International Organization* 65(4): 673-707.
- Hawkins, D. G. 2004. Explaining costly international institutions: persuasion and enforceable human rights norms. *International Studies Quarterly* 48(4): 779-804
- Kratochwil, F. and J. G. Ruggie. 1986. International organization: a state of the art on the art of the state. *International Organization* 40(4): 753-775.
- McLean, E. V. and R. W. Stone. 2012. The Kyoto Protocol: two-level bargaining and European integration. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 99-113.
- Mitchell, R. B. 1994. Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. *International Organization* 48(3): 425-458.
- Moravcsik, A. 2000. The origins of human rights regimes: democratic delegation in postwar Europe. *International Organization* 54(2): 217-252.
- Morrow, J. D. 1994. Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information. *International Organization* 48(3): 387-423.

- Nielson, D. L. and M. J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to international organizations: agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. *International Organization* 57(2): 241-276.
- Schneider, C. J. 2011. Weak states and institutionalized bargaining: power in international organizations. *International Organization* 55(2): 331-355.
- Stinnett, D. M., et al. 2011. Complying by denying: explaining why states develop nonproliferation export controls. *International Studies Perspectives* 12(3): 308-326.
- Thompson, A. 2006. Coercion through IOs: the Security Council and the logic of information transmission. *International Organization* 60(1): 1-34.