I. News articles and readings:
   A. Keohane article – “It turned out that the question needed to be reframed: not, “do states seek relative or absolute gains?” but “under what conditions do they forego even mutually beneficial cooperation to preserve their relative power and status.” Crucial point.
   B. Wendt article – small piece on constructivism to give you a taste of it.
      1. Think about racial, ethnic, and religious identities and how they create war and conflict
      2. AND how they are socially constructed
   C. Syrian chemical weapons treaty: Did this treaty make any difference in behavior? That is gist of institutionalist vs. realist debate.
   D. Do you worry that the Paris Climate Agreement isn’t strong enough? Do you worry that it will cripple the world economy if we really address climate change through this treaty? BOTH perspectives are fundamentally institutional – they both believe institutions matter.
   E. If there were a Israel/Palestinian peace treaty, do you think it would stop the conflict in the Middle East?
   F. Bailout of Greece by many other countries who receive few direct benefits from doing so.

II. Implications of realist theory for outcomes we will observe in IR.
   A. Realism summarized
      1. Power and interests, not ideals and norms, determine international outcomes.
      2. Structure, not intentions or desires, matter
   B. No cooperation, only strategic interaction that sometimes is harmony of power and interests. Lots of other forms of interaction, but don’t determine outcomes like power and interests do. Simple theory that explains a lot with a little. Realists concerned with the 80% puzzle of why always seeing conflict.
   C. Three types of state interaction
      1. Conflict: independent decision-making produces bad outcomes
      2. Harmony: independent decision-making produces good outcomes. “a situation in which actors’ policies (pursued in their own self-interests without regard to others) automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ objectives” (Keohane, After Hegemony, 1986, 200-201)
      3. Cooperation: interdependent decision-making produces good outcomes. “when the policies followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination” (1986:199).
   D. From realist perspective, when will we see international cooperation and international treaties?
      Treaties/regimes will arise, but only in the following circumstances:
      1. When put in writing or “codify” existing / expected future behavior; nukes on seabed, moon.
      2. When hegemonic state forces/induces other states to cooperate: Warsaw Pact.
      3. When resolving coordination games with few distributional effects: navigation and airplane traffic; diplomatic immunity.

III. Institutionalism
   A. Six tenets of institutionalism
      1. Focus of institutional theorists (what they seek to explain): cooperation
      2. Actors that institutional theorists think are important to understanding outcomes in international system: multiple (states, MNCs, NGOs, etc.) not necessarily unitary or rational
      3. Goals that institutional theorists think motivate the actors they see as important: multiple - economic and social as well as military goals
      4. Means that institutional theorists believe actors use to achieve their goals: multiple - asymmetries in interdependence, issue-specific power (as opposed to structural power) is important; military power costly and not always fungible or effective
      5. Organizing principle of the international system according to institutional theorists: anarchy mitigated by norms, rules, and principles of international law
      6. Dynamics of international system according to institutional theorists: alternating cooperation and conflict depending on who is interacting with whom on what issue.

IV. Institutionalism: Liberalism, institutionalism, regime theory, neoliberalism, complex interdependence: will use terms interchangeably.
   A. Institutionalism in a Nutshell: States can cooperate if they have (or can create) interdependence.
1. States sometime take interdependent, mutually contingent action in pursuit of their long run interests rather than always engaging in independent pursuit of their short run interests.

2. Essentially, institutionalists argue that even when faced with a Prisoners’ Dilemma type situation, states are able to find ways to cooperate. They do so by creating interdependence.

3. Interdependence defined: reciprocal costly effects of transactions - i.e., that states have connections and linkages on certain issues the changing of which involve costs for both countries involved. Two types of interdependence: sensitivity (costs a country faces before it can change its policies) and vulnerability (costs it faces even after it has changed its policies)

4. Interdependence need not be symmetric or even beneficial.

V. An outline of institutionalist theory.

A. Focus = cooperation. World of international politics - conflict and war are still common but states seem to cooperate sometimes.
   1. Puzzle is: “Why and how do states find ways to cooperate given anarchy of system?”
      Institutionalists want to explain ways states act differently today than did Athens and Sparta.
   2. How explain cooperation in arms control, trade, transportation, satellites, human rights, environment?

B. Actors = states important but not only or necessarily dominant actors; don’t always act in unitary and rational ways
   1. Many other actors involved: Multi-national corporations, church, non-governmental organizations or NGOs
   2. Not unitary actors. Corporations do international business without government consent - e.g., sales of nuclear technology.
   3. Many non-governmental links between countries.

C. Goals = state welfare and well-being
   1. States not altruistic, but interdependent and realize their well-being depends on well-being of others.
   2. States can be concerned with absolute gains, not just relative gains
   3. Once a state meets basic security needs, then economic and social well-being replace as goal. No consistent hierarchy of goals: security not always most important.

D. Means = military power not only means, not always fungible, not always effective
   1. Power still matters but comes from asymmetries of interdependence rather than military resources.
      Tools include linkage of issues and altering payoffs, long and short term reciprocity, international organizations, economic and diplomatic pressures
   2. Military force not always fungible, but trumps other forms of power. Military force often inappropriate to goals of state.
   3. Using military force is costly. Issue-specific power is what matters, not general military power.
      Power is relational and situational. Power to make WHO do WHAT?
   5. Issue-specific power allows some states to have power on some issues and others to have power on other issues.
      a) Brazil has power over US with respect to rainforest protection
      b) OPEC countries have power with respect to oil prices
      c) China has power over US because we want access to their markets – BUT note that China wants to avoid/limit its dependency on US by promoting LINUX operating system rather than Windows. Chinese government response is exactly what Waltz would predict – foregoing economic benefits because of fear of interdependence that could be used against it.

E. Organizing principle = governance without government
   1. Anarchy means no GOVERNMENT, not no GOVERNANCE
   2. International regimes affect bargaining that mediates between power as resources and power as influence over outcomes. International organizations tend to operate on one nation-one vote rule making rules different than would be if based on power.
   3. Rules are weak and don’t cover all issues, but doesn’t mean don’t exist and don’t influence behavior
   4. Rules
      a) Provide basis for common expectations to converge, reducing uncertainty, and lack of trust.
         Airline traffic and satellite rules.
      b) Help achieve otherwise unachievable goals. Acid rain information.
      c) Reduce costs of cooperation. Multilateral trade negotiations easier than bilateral agreements.
F. Dynamics of system = search for resolutions to conflict  
1. States in constant state of conflict and cooperation. Common interests in making a bigger pie by cooperating and conflicting interests in how that pie gets divided up.  
2. Rather than realists’ constant state of war, variation over time and across issues.

VI. Developing the argument of institutionalism  
A. Several different logical bases for argument:  
   1. Democratic institutionalism: people (vs. monarch) incur costs, so make war less often.  
   2. Economic institutionalism: interdependence and trade make war less likely by increasing costs of war. Economic growth through trade rather than war for territory.  
   3. Social institutionalism: transnational person to person contacts increase understanding and decrease misperception problems.  
   4. Liberal institutionalism: nations create international institutions as framework to structure interactions to make conflict less likely.

B. The power of institutions  
   1. Anarchy means no governMENt, not no governANCE. E.g., students and study groups.  
   2. Realists  
      a) Institutions REFLECT power, not constrain it.  
      b) Selection effects: good states join, bad states don’t join  
   3. Institutionalists: institutions can constrain power. Norms and rules increase certainty, avoid misperception, stabilize expectations.

C. Remember conflict/harmony/cooperation distinction.  
   1. Conflict: Independent action produces suboptimal outcomes  
   2. Harmony: Independent action produces good outcomes (3 mile territorial sea)  
   3. Cooperation: CONSCIOUS POLICY COORDINATION to avoid suboptimal outcomes of independent action.

D. Different definitions of “interest”: long-run vs. myopic interests.

E. Evidence of cooperation: actors acting against their short run, independent interests in order to achieve their long run, interdependent interests. States refrain from actions they would appear to otherwise want to take and states take actions they would appear to otherwise want to avoid taking.  
   1. Examples: French and Russian and oil from Iraq; arms control; human rights; environmental protection.  
   2. Lots of effort negotiating institutions  
   3. Reluctant to change institutions once negotiated.  
   4. Behavior different than expect otherwise, based on realist calculus.

VII. If outcomes are different, than why? When can regimes work? What do regimes provide?  
A. How does cooperation emerge in an anarchic world?  
B. Conditions for cooperation  
   1. Survival not at stake  
   2. Iteration: single play is harder.  
   3. Type of problems: coordination vs. collaboration. Some harder to solve than others  
   4. Number of players: more is harder. E.g., EU expansion  
C. Strategies for cooperation  
   1. Reciprocity: Tit-for-Tat strategies, link issues and make contingent. E.g., tariff wars.  
   2. Transparency and information: states comply when other states would know if they weren’t. E.g., rules against camouflaging weapons sites, data exchanges.  
   3. Iteration or “Shadow of future”: Create expectation of future interaction. E.g., North Korea nuclear deal; salami tactics.  
   4. Reduce transaction costs: Make easier to make agreements. E.g., GATT as mechanism for reaching agreement on tariffs. Easier to negotiate one big set of rules.  
   5. Norms and rules of thumb: Internalized norms. E.g., human rights norms that even US must reassess; nuclear and chemical use taboo; shipping societies.

VIII. Summary of institutionalism  
A. Ideals, norms, and rules, as well as power and interests, determine international outcomes.  
B. Structure matters but states can control structure to some extent.  
C. States seek solutions to their problems and attempt to make absolute welfare gains through cooperation that seeks to mitigate anarchy’s effects