

other theories of war that focus on how shifts in power may enhance the prospects for cooperation or conflict. Specifically, little attention is given to power transition theory, beyond dated work by A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler. Even more surprising, there is no discussion of Robert Powell's *In the Shadow of Power* (1999), perhaps the most rigorous and convincing treatment of power differentials and their effect on bargained outcomes.

On the whole, Copeland provides an elegant theory of major power war and evaluates it with several interesting case studies. Future work might explore the power of his theory with a statistical test that controls for competing explanations of the same phenomenon. This could provide a better gauge of how Copeland's dynamic differentials theory stands up to power transition theory and Powell's bargaining models.

**Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy: Industry, Environmentalists, and U.S. Power.** By Elizabeth R. DeSombre. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000. 316p. \$22.00 paper.

**Understanding Global Environmental Politics: Domination, Accumulation, Resistance.** By Matthew Paterson. London: Macmillan, 2000. 216p. \$49.95.

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In two provocative new books, Elizabeth DeSombre and Matthew Paterson attack two issues that call into question common assumptions about international environmental politics (IEP). Paterson asks: Does our global environmental predicament reflect unfortunate, but essentially unrelated, secular trends or the influence of deeper, structural forces? DeSombre asks: Does resolution of environmental problems, whatever their sources, require broad support among many countries, or can solutions arise from unilateral action by a single powerful state? Paterson's answer involves a refreshing critique of the IEP literature that shows how traditional realist and liberal approaches systematically ignore the underlying causes of global environmental change. DeSombre provides a trenchant analysis of when, how, and why a country will attempt, and succeed at, internalization of its own domestic environmental regulations. Both books make significant contributions to the growing IEP literature, extending it to important new areas of research.

In *Understanding Global Environmental Politics*, Paterson critiques international relations theories of IEP from a distinctly Green perspective. He claims, correctly, that most literature fails to ask about the origin of global environmental problems. Rather, it is assumed that they result from either "(a) an interstate 'tragedy of the commons' and/or (b) a set of secular trends which are treated as exogenous to any conceptual or theoretical enquiry" (p. 11). Paterson problematizes that assumption, offering instead a structural explanation that sees international environmental problems as predictable consequences of "four main, interrelated, power structures of world politics: the state system; capitalism; knowledge; and patriarchy" (p. 40). For Paterson, these power structures produce an inexorable drive for domination of and accumulation from nature, which in turn produces the plethora of environmental problems we face. He rejects the notion that environmental nongovernmental organizations, networks, and movements—in short, global civil society—can transform the practices of multinational corporations, governments, and consumers so long as underlying and "inherently unsustainable" structures remain in place (pp. 141, 159). Instead, resolving our global environmental crisis requires "a

politics of resistance, not of improving the way international treaties and institutions operate" (pp. 40, 160).

Paterson poses a frequently ignored question and proposes a challenging answer to it. Diverging from most IEP authors' grounding in mainstream theories of international relations, he builds on ecosocialism, social ecology, ecofeminism, green politics, and deep ecology (p. 4). From this base, he rejects the common view that "international power structures are [merely] inconsistent with principles of sustainability" and argues instead that they systematically and "systemically produce environmental change in the first place" (p. 5). Paterson begins by extracting the often implicit explanations of the causes of global environmental problems that are embedded in IEP scholarship. After showing these to be unsatisfactory, he presents a self-conscious and thoughtful argument that demonstrates how global environmental change is driven by dynamics inherent to the state system (state-building, military competition, environmental displacement, and hierarchy); to capitalism (growth, commodification, profit maximization, and inequity); to knowledge (the human-nature duality and the dominance of scientific legitimacy); and to patriarchy (individualism, instrumental rationality, domination).

Paterson evaluates these arguments through case studies of British experience with ocean encroachment and sea defenses, the development and support of an automobile culture, and the development of meat-eating culture and "McDonaldization." These cases provide absorbing illustrations of how the exigencies of state-building, global capitalism, the power accorded to Western science, and patriarchy explain efforts to tame the ocean and promote automobile-based and meat-based economies. The chapter on sea defenses highlights the "domination and accumulation" aspects of his argument, and the chapters on automobile culture and on fast food, consumer, and meat-eating cultures bring out his third theme of "resistance and transformation" to global power structures.

Although the book is interesting and well written, more careful case selection would have allowed Paterson to provide a stronger empirical foundation for his argument. As he notes, "it may seem odd, even indefensible, to base the book on cases drawn exclusively from the UK" (p. 8). Notwithstanding his argument that the cases reflect "practices and institutions [that] are 'local everywhere'" (p. 9), stronger support for the claim that global environmental change is driven by global political power structures would come from cases representing a wider variety of contexts. If global forces are the sources of our environmental woes, then similar evidence from other countries and regions should be readily available. Even adding anecdotal evidence drawn from, say, the United States and other European countries would have strengthened the arguments about the development of car and meat-eating cultures. Although Paterson clearly intended the cases to illustrate rather than test his theory, one still wants more evidence to show that the cases represent systemic problems of state-building, capitalism, and patriarchy, not just problems of British state-building, capitalism, and patriarchy.

Whereas Paterson focuses on the source of environmental problems, DeSombre focuses on their solutions. In *Domestic Sources of International Environmental Policy*, she addresses two different but interconnected questions: When will states attempt to internationalize their domestic environmental policies, and when will those attempts succeed? She develops a compelling theoretical argument that powerful states, and specifically the United States, will pressure other states to adopt their environmental standards whenever such interna-

tionalization simultaneously broadens protection of the resource and averts competitive disadvantages arising from unilateral regulation (p. 245). "A coalition of 'Baptists and bootleggers'—environmentalists and industry—forms" that pressures decision makers to extend domestic standards abroad (p. 45). Environmental and protectionist arguments can be persuasive in tandem, but neither proves persuasive alone. DeSombre makes specific, theoretically informed predictions about when incentives for internationalization should be strongest, namely, when the regulated industry competes abroad, when regulations involve processes and not products, and when effective environmental protection requires international action (p. 46).

To test her theory, DeSombre selects U.S. regulations involving five endangered species, three air pollutants, and five fisheries. These vary in terms of incentives for internationalization (her independent variable) and the environmental issues involved, but they are relatively representative of environmental issues generally and susceptible to systematic evaluation of domestic regulations and efforts to internationalize them (pp. 47–8). By selecting cases that vary on her independent variable rather than cases in which the United States attempted internationalization (her dependent variable, at this stage), DeSombre can compare predictions of when the United States will seek to internationalize regulations against actual experience. These predictions support her argument not only by showing that when economic and environmental incentives existed the United States sought internationalization, but also by showing that when either incentive was weak or absent the United States did not seek internationalization. By presenting cases in which a coalition of interests did not achieve internationalization, she is able to conclude, appropriately, that "a coalition of Baptists and bootleggers is thus a necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) condition to explain internationalization" (p. 131).

In the second half of the book, DeSombre switches attention to attempts to convince other states to adopt the desired environmental regulations (p. 137). Building on the extensive literature on economic sanctions, she examines the responsiveness of target states to U.S. pressure. DeSombre argues that the target state may adopt a new environmental policy because it believes doing so as in its own self-interest, because it views the request as legitimate in light of existing international rules and norms, or because the request is backed by a potent and credible threat. To evaluate this portion of her argument, DeSombre extends the analysis of the cases already developed. The cases provide strong support for her conclusion that self-interest and legitimacy "are not insignificant factors" (p. 138), but of greater significance is a threat made potent by the sending state's market power (dependent largely on exogenous characteristics of trade in the good in question) and made credible when the coalition pushing for adoption remains in existence and has incentives to follow through on imposing it (p. 247).

An otherwise impressive book is weakened by DeSombre's choice of an ambitious number of cases and a structure that, at times, obscures her theoretical argument. The three chapters on the push for internationalization each begin with about fifteen pages of case description, and the chapter on the success of internationalization efforts begins with 50 pages of background. The case descriptions vary considerably in thoroughness: Some are only a paragraph, others extend to nine pages. Theoretically motivated readers may find these materials too extensive, but empirically minded readers may find them too cursory. DeSombre's skill in cross-case analyses could have been used to better advantage had the whole of each empirical chapter, rather than only the second half,

been structured around theoretical constructs rather than cases.

Both Paterson and DeSombre have written engaging books that pose challenging new questions, questions that move beyond those that have commanded the attention of most authors working on international environmental politics for the last ten years. Just as important, both authors provide valuable theoretical frameworks that will point the way for others trying to answer them.

**War and Peace in International Rivalry.** By Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 319p. \$49.50.

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When the intellectual history of international relations inquiry is written for our time, *War and Peace in International Rivalry* may very well be seen as a seminal book. Along with Frank Wayman, Diehl and Goertz have been at the forefront of a major conceptual breakthrough in the way peace and war are studied. This book is their major statement of the subject and presents their most important findings.

Diehl and Goertz argue that the key to unlocking the causes of war is not to study the militarized disputes that precede the conflict and try to analyze why some situations escalate to war and others do not. Rather, we need to examine the underlying relationship that connects these disputes and can produce an enduring rivalry, which occurs when two states have six or more disputes within twenty years (p. 44). As they show, enduring rivals have a greater probability of going to war. Theoretically, this is a conceptual breakthrough because it takes scholars back to studying the underlying relationship that gives rise to war.

Too much of current research treats militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as if they were discrete independent events, unrelated to what precedes or follows. Challenging this assumption not only makes sense theoretically but also has implications for statistical analyses, because researchers often employ statistics that assume their observations are independent. Diehl and Goertz suggest that MIDs are not independent. They argue that rather than search for the causes of war, we should analyze how and why some pairs of states become enduring rivals, what it is about the dynamics of their rivalry that produces war, and how those dynamics might be changed to produce a peaceful relationship that would end the rivalry.

The book makes great headway in accomplishing this goal by addressing and often overcoming major conceptual and measurement problems, marshaling data that can provide some answers to the key questions, and demonstrating that such an approach will bear important empirical fruit. The authors begin with an analysis of how rivalry should be defined. Even critics of their particular definition, like myself, must be impressed with the thoroughness of their discussion and their review of the history of the concept. They produce a typology—isolated rivals, proto-rivals, and enduring rivals—that will be widely used in the field. My one quibble is that I prefer to think of it as a typology of conflict relationships that have become militarized, with isolated conflict at one end and rivalry at the other.

A key contribution is data on interstate enduring rivalry from 1816 to 1992. There is a wealth of descriptive information in this book of use not only to quantitative scholars but also to more historically oriented scholars. This includes information on which states are enduring rivals (pp. 145–6); how rivalries are distributed over time; the number of