Lecture #1  
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# Introduction

## Introductions of self and class

# Why do states organize rather than simply operate independently and unilaterally?

## Find selves in system of anarchy and that leads to what they perceive as problems or “suboptimal outcomes.” No government or governance system exists to solve problems so they organize to:

### Solve problems: Make bad things ok

### Seize opportunities: Make good things better

## Three major elements of international organization serve as themes of course

### **The Structure of International Problems: How do the problems that states face differ?** What sorts of problems do states face? How do they vary? Are some harder than others to resolve? If so, how can we tell? What role do non-state actors play in creating, identifying, and fixing problems?

### **International Institutions and Other Responses: How do the designs of the solutions states create differ?** How do states organize themselves to mitigate or solve those problems? Do solutions differ by problem type? Do non-state actors offer alternatives to intergovernmental solutions?

### **The Effects of International Institutions: How does the performance of the solutions states create differ?** Why does one institution “work” while another fails? How does the design of a regime influence its effectiveness? How do contextual factors outside the control of those designing the regime (end of Cold War, beginning of war Ion terror) influence their effectiveness? What strategies can regimes use to be more effective? How do we know if a regime has been effective? What role can non-state actors play in making regimes more or less effective?

### **How do the answers to these questions differ by issue areas?** This course will go over a range of different topics and issue areas, with the hope of identifying how these three themes compare when discussing security, trade, human rights, environment, etc.

# How international governance differs from domestic governance

## Constraint of anarchy generates the puzzle of international organization

### Anarchic environment – no constraints on behavior other than power and interests

### Atomistic actors – no altruism, no society

### If realists are right, which they seem to be (at least in part), then any cases in which states truly cooperate deserves our attention. Also, we normatively prefer cooperation to conflict and want to promote cooperation and stop conflict.

## **At domestic level**, governments can solve collective action problems:

### Variety of interests among citizens but, generally, less heterogeneity than internationally, more common allegiance, more willingness to submit and belief in sacrifice for the community than at international level - none perfect but more than at international level.

### Conflict and collective action: Conflicts usually resolved, if necessary by governmental force, joint action, or joint contributions to action

### Establish rules: Governments, generally, operate by majority rule, at best - consensus is not required and opting out is not allowed

### Expectation of compliance: non-compliance generally considered illegitimate

### Enforcement: Governments can also “enforce” rules against their citizenry

#### Doing so is, generally, considered legitimate independent of whether the “target” of the enforcement agreed to the rule

#### Doing so is often effective because government has more power than target

## **International level differs**: no overarching government to perform these functions.

### Conflict and collective action: conflict often remains unresolved – strong do what they can while weak suffer what they must (Thucydides); far less collective action

#### Little sense of collective identity and responsibility. After 9/11 many people had a stronger sense of what they were willing to sacrifice in terms of being American – increases in taxes, joining military, etc. Much less true at international level – sense of us vs. them only makes us global citizens when we are under attack from outside, e.g., Mars

### Establish rules: agreement to cooperate hard to achieve, even on paper - governance only for those who consent to be governed. Rules exist but are weaker, less stable, less effective, and harder to enforce

### Expectation of compliance: opting out and non-compliance more often considered legitimate

### Enforcement: Even once agree on paper, hard to produce different outcomes than had before

#### Rules aren’t binding accept on those who accept to be bound by them (law a la carte)

#### Even if country accepts to be bound in general, may choose to violate in certain situations and means of enforcing are less clear at international level than at domestic level – some do exist and we will discuss them, but they are certainly different in quality as well as quantity from domestic options

#### States must use own resources to enforce rules, similar to how contracts are enforced in criminal underworld or in countries like Russia with no functioning system of contract law.

# International Organization vs. International OrganizationS??

## International OrganizationS are organizations established by national governments to help them deal with common problems such as trade, environmental protection, telecommunications, air travel, and so on.

### They are bureaucratic entities, like schools or corporations or government agencies within countries.

### They have physical locations, permanent staff, boards of directors, budgets, computers, desks and telephones, and organizational missions.

### Contrast with NGOs or MNCs; sometimes “IGO” used to be clear.

### Thousands in the world today. Examples?

## International Organization is:

### Effort to impose rules and regulations upon disorderly world of international politics

### May involve creation of formal international organizations

### But need not – sometimes involves treaties without organizations (e.g., much of US-Russian arms control), informal understandings (territorial seas initially, Bush desire for arms control reductions), rules of diplomatic immunity, etc.

# Regimes, Institutions and Organizations

## ***Terminology == regimes and institutions are same thing, interchangeable terms***. International organizations are different!

## International regimes and international institutions are broader sets of arrangements for global governance that go beyond, but include, international organizations

## NOT use of the term “regime” as domestic government of country we don’t like

## In IR, regimes are sets of rules created by states in order to standardize and coordinate their behavior with respect to specific issues.

## NOT world government but set of rules states use to try to govern behavior in a particular issue area

## EU is closest thing to world government in world today and its powers are relatively limited but increasing

## Regimes more modest and specialized arrangements - focus on well-defined activities, resources, regions

## Regimes/institutions cover almost every imaginable issue on the world agenda: human rights; international trade; allocation of orbital slots for satellites; protection of polar bears; international mail delivery; protection of the ozone layer; and nuclear nonproliferation—to name but a few.

## Regimes are created by states, and primary members are states, though all states are not members of all

## Membership in international institutions is voluntary; states participate because they believe that they will be better off with regimes than without them.

# Effects of international institutions: International institutions are, by definition, beneficial to the states that join them (if they weren’t, states wouldn’t join). HOWEVER, this does NOT mean that:

## Every state that joins is better off than without the institution. They may be better off than not joining but that doesn’t mean better off than no institution. There is “go it alone” power – some might prefer organization was never created but can’t prevent it from being created – e.g., UK’s response to EU

## States that don’t join may be worse off – OPEC harms non-members

## Non-state actors (even those within states that prefer agreements) may not see it as in their interests

## Why does right dislike international organization? Too much constraint on states

## Why does left dislike international organization? Too little constraint on states and other actors

## Both positions suggest that the question is not “organization or not” but what types of organization

# Additional thoughts

## Necessity is not the mother of invention in international affairs

### Lots of problems but not lots of solutions

### Many problems can’t be fixed by unilateral action but this doesn’t mean they will be fixed

### When international organization arises, doesn’t mean it benefits all countries or people

## Non-state actors matter: Not just states anymore.

### Sept 11th clarified that considerably for Americans.

### MNCs have considerable influence

### But so do NGOs – killed Multilateral Agreement on Investment in 1997, created landmine treaty

### Informal networks, such as internet

### International organizations – courts trying Milosevic, and perhaps bin Laden; EU changing money and regulating lawn mower noise

### Religions – from Catholic church during Crusades to Al Qaeda today

### Allegiances to states are still strong, but allegiances to other bodies are also strong. Nationalism is strong but so are other -isms.

# Walk through syllabus

## Interspersing theoretical arguments with issue-specific readings and arguments

## Readings for Thursday –READINGS due BEFORE class for which they are assigned.

### Young, Ch.1

### Shanks, C., et al. 1996. Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations: 1981-1992. *International Organization* 50(4): 593-627.

#### Overview of the history of international organizations

### Krasner, S. D. 1982. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization* 36(1): 185-205.

#### Role of theory and international orgs/regimes as causes

## Why I chose the Oran Young book

### Good conceptualization of International organization rather than international organizations

### Theoretical approach to the problem throughout // Attentive to problem structure, which I see as crucial

### Downside = excessive focus on environment. I recognize this but think it's a cost that is worth incurring because we can overcome it by looking at other issue areas and because of the other virtues of the book.

## Developing inductively a comparative perspective on international organization related to three major elements mentioned above.

### ***Problem structure:*** What’s the nature of the problems in each issue area? Are there different types of problems in this issue area? Would all countries benefit from international action or just some? Why is there a demand for international organization? What is the problem that international organization is seeking to solve? Do some problems seem harder to resolve than others? Which ones and why? What lead to action on this problem? Why was it addressed at time T rather than before or after that - new knowledge and understandings, new actors in power, new domestic political pressures?

### ***Institutional design:*** What did countries agree to, if anything, in this issue area? Were all countries willing to work on the problem? Were countries coerced into joining negotiations and contributing to the solution or were their actions voluntary because they desired a solution? To what extent do the solutions devised reinforce the interests of powerful states? To what extent to they undercut the interests of powerful states? Why were states able to reach agreement in some cases but not others?

### ***Institutional Effects and Effectiveness:*** How effective are the solutions actually agreed to? Is there evidence that behaviors are any different than they would have been otherwise? What mechanisms and strategies are leading states to behave differently? Why do some strategies succeed and others fail? Do the strategies succeed against all states or only some? Is behavioral change driven by a “logic of consequences” or a “logic of appropriateness?”

### All of this will be done comparatively over course of the term.

# Conclusion