Lecture #2  
27 September 2018  
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# Intro: this lecture reviews structure of whole class

# Readings for Tuesday: Good rule of thumb for readings -- make sure you understand the title

## Young, Ch. 3

## [Koremenos, et al.: 2001](#_ENREF_1) *Read full article but focus on INdependent Variables section (773-780)*.

## Stein – basic division of two types of problems. On 317-318, he discusses differences between regimes, institutions, and international organization == disregard that for purposes of this class.

# Structure of course: The big picture and the puzzles of international institutions

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Problem Structure | Institutional Formation and Design | Effectiveness |
| Theory | Young, Ch. 3  Koremenos, et al. 2001  Rittberger & Zürn 1990  Stein 1982  Underdal 2002 | Young, Ch. 2  Young/Osherenko 1993  Koremenos, et al. 2001 | Young, Ch. 4 & Ch. 5  Downs, et al. 1996  Mitchell 2009  Jacobson/Brown-Weiss 1998 |
| Security | Müller 2013 | Hemmer/Katzenstein 2002 | Duffield 1992 |
| Trade | Milner 2013  Garrett 1992  Parsons 2010 | Kucik & Reinhardt 2008 | Tallberg 2002 |
| Human Rights | Schmitz & Sikkink 2013 | Joachim 2003 | Neumayer 2005 |
| Environment | Mitchell 2009 | Mitchell & Keilbach 2001 | Bernauer & Siegfried 2008 |

## Puzzles in theory (of any sort) stem from a disconnect between a theoretical preconception or expectation of what you expect to see and an unexpected empirical observation of something different. Puzzles arise when you say “that’s surprising” or “that’s odd.”

## PS205 leaves you with several questions and puzzles:

### Institutional formation: Why (and when) do states form international institutions?

#### Puzzle: realists say states shouldn’t cooperate, but we observe them negotiating agreements

### Institutional design: Why, given that they do form them, do they design them as they do?

#### IR theory says states should design institutions in response to problems they want to solve (functionalism) but we lack clear predictions. Do we see institutions that look as we expect?

### Institutional influence: How, given that states cannot be coerced to do what they do not want to do, do international institutions ever influence the behavior of states?

#### Puzzle: realists claim that, if states are dumb enough to create institutions, they certainly shouldn’t change their behavior in response to them if it is costly to do so.

### Non-state action: Why isn’t all this “international organization” limited to just states?

#### Puzzle: realists claim states are main actors in IR, not non-states. Yet lots of evidence that non-state actors influence state behavior AND non-state action that bypasses states.

# Overview of world of IOs/IGOs (Shanks, et al. reading) [Terminology: IOs and IGOs can be treated as interchangeable terms --International organizations (IOs) vs. international governmental organizations (IGOs)]

## Numbers of IOs have grown; Many IOs are “emanations,” created by other IOs rather than by states

## IOs vary by function (general, political/military, economic, social welfare) and membership (universal, geographic, purpose-oriented)

## Membership in IOs has varied over time. Countries join traditional IOs more than emanations. SJK explain: 3 factors “determine number of IGOs to which a country belongs”, including skill and literacy of population, economic capacity, political openness, length since independence, type of government,

## Less “competition” among IOs than during Cold War -- IOs are increasingly framed to be inclusive and help all members meet their needs (at least nominally)

## A word about “Five snapshots” section that describes IOs in terms of the relationship between them and the number of members, literacy, income, democracy, power. This is typical in academic studies of international relations: look through existing data to find correlations that explain variation over time or across countries/regimes. They seek to “explain IGO membership”.

## What should know after reading this article? Major points of this article are:

### Research questions: why do states join IOs in the first place? View this from states’ perspective or IO’s perspective (why does this IO have more of one type of state than some other, relatively similar IO?). What causes change in the types of IOs that are out there and the state membership in them.

### Uses of data: how do political scientists try to make sense of what is happening. First by describing clearly what is happening and then by seeking explanations of it.

### Facts about IOs during this period: introduction to basic facts about IOs you should know.

## Krasner reading: Regimes/institutions as intervening variables

### Institutions intervene between “basic causal variables” & “behaviors/outcomes” of state interactions







## Basic point of article: how institutions intervene- when states form institutions, do they generate behaviors/outcomes different than they otherwise.

# Overview of course

## In international realm, states cannot get help from world government so create some governance that suits situation at hand, rather than set up generic government to address all situations. “Government a la carte”

## Three major parts of course

### What IS structure of international problems and how does difficulty of resolving problems vary? This is the “demand for governance” vs. the supply of governance that Young speaks of (pp. 1-2 of book). “Demand for governance”: that states face suboptimalities/problems & seek solutions.

### What DETERMINES formation and design of international institutions - this is the supply of governance *institutions* on paper. It's how states decide whether and what they want to do -- it's the plan of action, with focus on ***plan***. It's the legal framework, the laws and regulations, if you will.

### What DETERMINES effects of international institutions -- this is influence of governance efforts

# Problem structure: CORE aspects – START 1st PORTION OF COURSE

## Here addressing **descriptive** questions of:

### Do some states see a problem as existing and worthy of spending time trying to resolve it?

### What is the “shape” or structure of the problem?

### But ALSO, causal problem of what makes a problem harder or easier / malign or benign?

## First, what is a problem? Problems are simply "suboptimal outcomes."

### In anarchic international system, absence of any pre-existing government or governance system to solve problems requires some degree of "self-organization" by the actors involved to either "make bad things ok" or "make good things better"

### No objective definition of a problem. Only a problem if at least one actor thinks there is one.

## Second, what is "problem structure"? Problem structure are the characteristics of the "pre-institutional" setting. That is, how do things look BEFORE (i.e., in ABSENCE OF) any international institution?

## Elements of problem structure: Overview

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Nine Questions | Definition | Influence on Institutional Design | Influence on Institutional Effects |
| Q1: Conflict/harmony/cooperation |  |  |  |
| Q2: Actors |  |  |  |
| Q3: Capacities/power |  |  |  |
| Q4: Incentives/preferences |  |  |  |
| Q5: Information/knowledge |  |  |  |
| Q6: Norms/values |  |  |  |
| Q7: Violation tolerance |  |  |  |
| Q8: Inherent transparency |  |  |  |
| Q9: Response incentives |  |  |  |

## Question 1: Conflict/harmony/cooperation?

### Does at least one country see others as engaging in "bad" behavior? Are states interdependent? Think of "problem structure" as answering: "What type of problem is this?"

### Harmony – INdependent decision-making produces desirable or "good" outcomes, i.e., outcomes that those who COULD push for change find acceptable enough that they do NOT push for change. “When actors' policies automatically facilitate the attainment of others' goals” [Keohane: 1988, 380](#_ENREF_25).

### Conflict (including deadlock) - INdependent decision-making produces undesirable, suboptimal, or "bad" outcomes, i.e., to outcomes that those actors who COULD push for change find sufficiently UNacceptable that they DO push for change. In conflict, “actors' policies hinder the realization of others' goals, and are not adjusted to make them more compatible” [Keohane: 1988, 380](#_ENREF_25).

### Cooperation – INTERdependent decision-making produces desirable or "good" outcomes. “When cooperation takes place, each party changes his or her behavior contingent on changes in the other's behavior” [Keohane: 1988, 380](#_ENREF_25).

## **Question 2 – Actors: WHO are relevant actors?**

### What type of actors cause the problem? Governments, NGOs, Corporations, Individuals, Networks (drug and sex trade traffickers, Al Qaeda, etc.), Religions, Mixes of these and other types

### Which actors, even if they don’t cause the problem, could help resolve it?

### How many actors are involved?

## **Question 3 – Capacities/Power: What CAN actors do?** Opportunities, capacity, and power structure

### Do countries "causing the problem" have opportunities and capacity to engage in "good" behavior or lack the opportunities and capacity to engage in bad behavior?

#### Only a few states can build nuclear weapons so nuclear proliferation different than landmines or conventional weapons

#### All states can refrain from violating civil and political rights but many developing states cannot provide citizens even most basic health care and educational needs

### Do those doing “bad” behavior have power to ignore calls for behavior change? Do those desiring “good” behavior have enough power to use incentives or sanctions to get others to change behavior?

#### Powerful countries can gain enough from fixing a problem that they do so without help from others, e.g., post-WWII Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and global economic order

### Problem types: Positive Externalities Plagued by Incapacity

## **Question 4 – Incentives/Preferences:** **What do actors WANT?** Incentive structure and interests

### How do ***material*** incentives for countries "causing the problem" depend on behavior of other countries? What are "natural"/"pre-institutional" incentives to engage in "good " behavior, if any?

### Problem structures derive from perpetrators/victims distinction and incentives

#### Perpetrators - those who are BOTH capable and have incentives to contribute to the problem

#### Victims - those who are EITHER incapable or lack incentives to contribute to the problem

### Problem types

#### Upstream/downstream problem

#### Coordination problems

#### Collaboration problems

## **Question 5 -- Information/Knowledge: What do actors KNOW?** Informational structure and transparency

### Are their ***unknown effects*** of their behaviors for those "causing the problem" that, if they knew about them, ***would make engaging in good behavior more attractive*** than bad behavior, regardless of what others do? Perpetrating country's behavior causes problems for other countries but also causes problems for itself which they are unaware of and which, if they knew about them, would cause them to stop the bad behavior.

### Inherent transparency: Consider the difference between arms races and trade wars. In trade wars, everyone knows how high the other state's tariffs are. But in arms races there is uncertainty about other state's weapons.

### Problem types: Epistemic/Knowledge Problem.

## **Question 6 – Norms/Values: What do actors VALUE?** Normative structure

### Is the "bad" behavior normatively defensible within existing rhetoric or, even before a solution is created, is the behavior in question considered bad? Compare tariffs/landmines to torture/genocide

### Are consequences not material in nature but other countries, even though they are not affected in material way, nonetheless consider it bad and illegitimate for the other country to behave that way?

### Problem types: Normative Problem

## **Question 7 - Violation tolerance**

### How much can noncooperation be tolerated? For example, nuclear weapons vs. wargames

## **Question 8 - Inherent transparency**

### How easily can noncooperation be hidden? For example, tariff rates vs. NTB

## **Question 9 - Response incentives**

### How strong are incentives to respond to noncompliance? Arms control vs. HR

## Hypotheses – Problems are harder to resolve if:

### If some countries are perpetrators but not victims

### If powerful state has NO incentives to address problem

### If most states have the ability to violate

### If there are “countervailing” norms that foster INaction on the problem

# Institutional formation and design – VERY BRIEF INTRO TO 2nd PART OF COURSE

## **Two main causal** questions:

### When (under what conditions) do states form institutions? What prompts states to form institutions and what factors make it easier/harder (more likely/less likely) to form institutions?

### What type of institution gets formed? How do states design institutions to address problems?

## What type of institution and decision-making system to have? Institutional Type:

### Young’s categories (p. 6): regulatory, procedural, programmatic, generative

### Variation across these similar to Koremenos’ “flexibility” variable

#### Generative/procedural/programmatic (flexibility planned in – generative is even framework/protocol; procedural – decide the rules later; programmatic – decide what to fund and what not to fund)

#### Regulatory (less flexible though not totally inflexible): Opt out clauses, exit strategies, renegotiation clauses

## Who should be in it? Membership -- who must be involved to solve the problem? Limited membership in export control regimes to address nonproliferation vs. wide membership to lower tariff levels

## What should be required? Primary rule system: ambitiousness, proscriptions/prescriptions, specificity, capacity development, scope (broad/narrow); common vs. differentiated obligations. Variation due to strength of preferences and actions and capacities of actors.

## What do we need to know? Information system: type and strengthen of monitoring/verification. Coordination problems, collaboration problems, inherent transparency problems

## How should we respond? Response system: type (sanctions, rewards, etc), retaliatory or not, goals of response, reciprocity’s effectiveness, targetability, incentives for follow-through

## Linking hypotheses: some examples

### Few actors responsible and affected by it lead to smaller membership. Bilateral arms control (strategic nuclear arms control) vs. multilateral arms control (nonproliferation treaty)

### Epistemic (poor knowledge) problem --> procedural/programmatic institution

### Collaboration problem PLUS Violation Intolerance --> strong monitoring and enforcement clauses

### Coordination problem --> no monitoring OR response system

### Upstream/downstream problem --> response system requires rewards not sanctions

# Institutional effects and effectiveness – VERY BRIEF INTRO TO 3rd PART OF COURSE

## **Several causal questions**:

### Can you show behaviors influenced by agreement?

#### counterfactual

#### goal-achievement sense

### WHY did agreement work? What causal mechanism? Why do some institutions work and not others?

#### Characteristics of problem

#### Characteristics of agreement

### Effects that are not effectiveness: equity, non-targeted realms (labor v. environment v. economic growth)

## Linking hypotheses (examples): How problem structure & institutional design influence effectiveness

### Coordination problems --> no compliance problems

### Institutions addressing upstream/downstream less effective than coordination problems

### Institutions with sanctions more effective than those without

# Conclusion

## Review of readings for the day and suggestions for next weeks readings

## Review of structure of course and where we will be going during the term