Lecture #5

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# Introduction

## Apply problem structure to real-world problems

## Crucial point: Identifying a problem’s problem structure: COMPARING is easiest way to classify real-world problem structures. Easier to say “issue area A is more transparent than issue area B” than to say “issue area A is transparent”

# Basic understanding of the problem structures of security problems

## Four types of problems: There are others: choosing these to show variation WITHIN issue area

### Territorial disputes: Deadlock = Palestinian/Israeli conflict; Spratly Islands conflict

### Arms races: Collaboration problems

#### Different types of weapons have different features

### Use of landmines: NGO created this as a normative problem

### Precluding nuclear weapons development: nuclear export controls

## See Game Matrices for these that are in the Powerpoint

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| --- | --- |
|  | Security |
| Q1: Conflict/harmony/cooperation Do states see non-cooperation as suboptimal? | Conflict but sometimes deadlockSecurity dilemma: countries develop/deploy weapons to increase security but, if both sides do it, they spend more but don’t increase securityTerritorial disputes: deadlock; Palestine-Israel (Spratly Islands??)Landmines: NGOs created conflict where governments didn’t see any |
| Q2: Actors | Almost exclusively governments Chem-bio-small arms: manyNuclear: fewerWargames: neighbors only |
| Q3: Capacities/power | Chem-bio-small arms: all capableNuclear: few capable and “haves” can preclude development by have-notsWargames: all capablePower varies and matters a lot |
| Q4: Incentives/preferences(when capacity issues not in play) | Most arms races are collaboration gamesInsecure countries prefer own weaponryBut some countries opt for “economic security”Coordination games in alliance weapon deployment |
| Q5: Information/knowledge | Most states believe more weapons equal more security but it’s costly (haves attempt to convince have-nots that not having is in their interests but this rarely works) |
| Q6: Norms/values | Some weapons considered morally wrong but not allRight to defend yourself but not with morally inappropriate weapons |
| Q7: Transparency/ability to cheat | Strong incentives and ability to keep weapons development and deployment secretHarder to keep wargames secret |
| Q8: Response incentives | Strong incentives to make a response but not to reinforce the agreement but to respond to the threatCan’t target response at single country (weapons threaten all)Chem-bio-small arms: rather tolerantNuclear: not tolerant at allWargames: somewhat tolerant |

# Theoretical implications / predictions: What do some of these differences in problem structure suggest for:

## How hard it is to negotiate international institution

## What shape international institution will take and what kind of design it will have

## How effective international institution will be

# Conclusion

## Identifying real-world variation in problem structure

## Value of COMPARING problem structure of different issue areas in a relative way or on a relative scale. Much harder to assess problem structure in an absolute way or absolute scale.

## Variation between security and trade BUT ALSO variation within each

### Chem/bio/small arms vs. nuclear

### Tariffs/quotas vs. subsidies/NTBs