Lecture #10
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# Goal: Get you thinking about how

## To take social science theory

## Make predictions about what you will see in the world if theory is correct

## Look at evidence from the world to see if you are correct

## If so, your theory is worth keeping for awhile

## If not, revise or replace your theory – it doesn’t work!

# Hemmer and Katzenstein reading

## Focus on research question: why multilateral security institutions in Europe but bilateral ones in Asia?

### Question: “Security arrangements in Asia remain a puzzle. Multilateral institutions failed despite the presence of self-interested benefits from cooperation. Even though, as in Europe, multilateral security arrangements would have provided information, reduced transaction costs, made commitments more credible, and established focal points for coordinating policies, after 1945 the U.S. government opted for a hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in Asia with the United States at the center. "If NATO was so successful in Europe," asks Masaru Kohno, "why was it not copied in East Asia in the aftermath of World War II?"” (Hemmer and Katzensein, 2002, 576-577).

### General point: international institutions are not as “rational” as Koremenos et al. argue. Human prejudices and identities matter in whether institutions form and what shape they take.

## Note form of argument

### Build argument for their explanation by showing other arguments can’t do the work

### Soviet threat was more compelling in Europe than in Asia partly because US saw itself as culturally tied to Europe in ways it did not perceive in Asia

### “Once Southeast Asia, in the view of U.S. policymakers, was constructed as a region composed of alien and, in many ways, inferior actors, bilateralism followed closely” (Hemmer and Katzensein, 2002, 588).

### Words matter for institutional formation: not a European alliance but a North Atlantic alliance

### Role of race: “Identification had an undeniable racial component. … In [Congressional] testimony, [U.S. Assistant Secretary of State] Clayton explicitly … argued that ‘my idea would be that in the beginning the union would be composed of all countries that have our ideas and ideals of freedom and that are composed of the white race’” (Hemmer and Katzensein, 2002, 593).

# Hypotheses linking Problem Structure to Institutional Design

## Hypotheses regarding problem structure and its effect on institutional design

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| PROBLEM STRUCTURE(Independent Variables) |  | INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN(Dependent Variables) |
| Conflict?If both/all relevant actors prefer the outcomes of conflict more than any viable option for its resolution (Deadlock) | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Institutional TypeWill NOT form an institution, despite repeated efforts |
| Capacities 1If the CAPACITY to engage in BAD behavior depends on other actors | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Institutional Type,Membership and Primary Rule SystemREGULATORY institution whichLIMITS membership to states already capable of bad behavior ANDCOMMON obligations to *ban* behaviors that would allow others to engage in bad behavior |
| Capacities 2If some actors lack the CAPACITY to engage in GOOD behavior(Positive externalities plagued by incapacity) | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Institutional Type,Membership and Primary Rule System and Response SystemProgrammatic institution which EXPANDS membership to include donors and recipients ANDHas DIFFERENTIATED obligations, with donors and recipients being required to do different things ANDRESPONSE will involve capacity enhancements, not rewards or sanctions |
| Incentives 1Coordination problemUp/Downstream problemCollaboration problem | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Institutional Type,Primary Rule System and Response SystemCoordination: Regulatory institution with COMMON obligations with no significant response systemUp/Downstream: Regulatory institution with DIFFERENTIATED obligations with response system based on linkage to other issues Collaboration: Regulatory institution with COMMON obligations with response system based on retaliation or “reversion to status quo”  |
| Incentives 2If the INCENTIVES that states have to cheat on institutional rules are STRONG | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Information System andResponse SystemHas clearly specified INSPECTION rules ANDHas clearly specified RESPONSE rules-- Inspection and response LIKELY for collaboration and upstream/downstream but UNlikely for coordination |
| Information and KnowledgeIf actors lack INFORMATION about consequences of good or bad behavior | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Institutional Type, Information Systemand Response SystemProgrammatic OR procedural institution with weak or non-existent information systems and response systemsNOTE: some problems can reflect multiple problems (e.g., some collaboration problems also have information problems) |
| NormsIf the problem involves efforts by some to instill NORMS in others | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Institutional Type andResponse SystemGenerative institution whichDoes not rely on rewards, and relies on SANCTIONS only if a strong *pre-institutional* norm against the behavior exists |
| Violation ToleranceIf states are very concerned about what happens if other states cheat | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Response System andInformation SystemHas STRONG and SPECIFIC INSPECTION proceduresHas STRONG and SPECIFIC response system OR allows states to leave institution easily |
| Inherent TransparencyIf EASY for actors to get INFORMATION about other actors’ behavior | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Information SystemHas WEAK or non-existent INSPECTION procedures  |
| Response IncentivesIf actors have WEAK incentives to respond if a violation occurs | then it is likely that states will create an institution that | Information System andResponse SystemHas WEAK or non-existent INSPECTION proceduresANDWeak or non-existent RESPONSE procedures |

# Arms Control – general comparison

## How do differences in problem structures lead to differences in institutional design? When have states that had the incentives and the capability to acquire particular types of weapons given up those weapons because of a regime? Institutional obstacles to any agreement (though note there are many agreements)

### Strength of relative gains concerns seriously influences what can and can't be done.

### Difference in interests and concerns -- does one want technologies for one's own country and other countries one "likes" or not.

### Differences in capabilities -- those who think they can win a race are more likely to resist agreements that hobble the ability to run the race.

### Often, countries don't have incentives to join agreements: French and Italians don’t join 1930 London Naval Conference; some states don’t join NPT; US hasn’t joined Landmine treaty; Arab states have argued in favor of chemical weapons; US withdraws from 1972 ABM Treaty in 2002

## Bioweapons Control

### Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is a legally binding treaty outlawing biological arms - discussed 1969, signed 1972, entered into force March 26, 1975. 146 state-parties, 17 signatories.

### Primary rule system: Bans development, stockpiling, acquisition, retention and production

### Information system:

#### Initially no inspection system in treaty

##### 1986 President Reagan helped strengthen the BWC by having an annual exchange of information on biodefense programs and maximum-containment laboratories

### Bush Sr. broadened information exchange and took part in verification feasibility study group (VEREX)

##### Clinton accepted VEREX’s conclusions and initiated negotiation of a legally binding protocol "to promote compliance …" (BWC Protocol)

##### July 2001 - US rejected the BWC Protocol

### Response system: Treaty mandates state-parties consult, cooperate, complain to UN Security Council to solve compliance concerns. Security Council can investigate complaints - has never been invoked

## Chemical Weapons Control

### Negotiations started 1980. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) opened for signature 1993, effective 1997. CWC has 151 state-parties, 25 signatories yet to ratify including Israel. Significant non-signatories include Syria, North Korea, Libya, (and Iraq)

### Primary rule system: State-parties required to declare in writing stockpiles and facilities in 30 days, begin destruction within 2 years, complete destruction in 10 years

### Information system: CWC calls for complete and VERIFIED elimination of chemical weapons by 2007. Routine and Unannounced inspections

## Conventional weapons

### Agreements

#### 1889 St. Petersburg Declaration banning use of dum-dum bullets (but allows use against non-signatories. Dum-dum bullets declaration of 1889 quite effective and norm develops over time -- what explains its success vs. that of other similar agreements?

#### 1981 Conventional Weapons Convention: can't even agree that weapons being restricted actually are "excessively injurious or had indiscriminate effects" even though this is in title to convention (Spear, 571).

#### 1977-1978 Conventional Arms Transfer Talks never reach agreement and 1974 conventional arms talks fail as well (Spear 579).

#### 1973-1988 Mutual Balanced Force Reduction negotiation efforts that "never achieved any tangible results" (Spear, 573). But follow-on Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement starts in 1989 and reaches agreement in 1990. Why the difference in success?

### Spear, 585: "A key lesson of the twentieth century is that better relations between states must precede an arms control or disarmament agreement if it is to achieve its aims and last." If that is true, doesn't it make it hard to sort out whether the "better relations" or the agreement is the cause of any achievement of aims that occurs? How can you build an argument that helps you sort this stuff out?

# Nuclear Arms Control, especially comparing NPT and INF agreements

## Basic problem: independent decisions lead to increasing costs yet greater risks of/in war

## If no agreement, arms race continues

## Key features: collaboration problem, no incapacity (or, in NPT, incapacity helps), no transparency, violation intolerant, strong response incentives

## Arms Control

### Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - Signed 1968 - entered into force 1970.

#### 8 countries have nuclear weapons (North Korea?); 4 have “stepped down”; ~20 are a "screwdriver away"; 69 countries have nuclear power programs, and with $1 billion investment could have a bomb

#### Who’s trying? Only 4 states in last decade - North Korea, Iran, Libya? Iraq until recently. Technical capability denied by cooperation among states that have nuclear weapons

#### Many states could have WMD - why don’t they? Motivations of Security Threats, Domestic Politics, Norms of Prestige

#### Once U.S. and Soviet Union recognized they both had "enough" - began to set up a world to limit the spread of nukes, and other WMD

#### Types of obligations: differentiated. Can we explain this?

##### Five nuclear weapons states (NWS) commit to seeking complete disarmament

##### Non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) agree to forgo developing nuclear weapons

#### Types of information system: careful inspection under IAEA. Can we explain this?

#### Types of response mechanisms: rewards. Can we explain this?

##### NNWS agree to refrain from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons - allowed and aided with "peaceful" nuclear technology

##### NNWS assured neighbors won’t get Nukes

##### Great powers provide positive and negative security assurances

##### Enforced, when needed, by most powerful states because its in their interests -- "incentive-compatible"

### Export control regimes

#### Memberships are much more limited: Wassenaar and CoCom agreements -- efforts to control exports of dangerous technologies to those who don't yet have them by those who do. Makes for a smaller negotiation and only among those with more similar interests.

#### Types of obligations: common obligations -- all must restrict technology exports equally

### Bilateral arms control

#### Different overall structure

#### ABM Treaty -- 1972 prohibited nationwide defenses against strategic ballistic missiles - "cornerstone of arms control". Limiting defenses would allow an end to the arms race - enshrining deterrence, prohibiting "first strike" strategies

##### Withdrawal of US in 2002

##### Types of obligations: restrictions on development of new technologies rather than on production of existing technologies. Compare to agreement on "blinding lasers" -- hadn't been developed when agreement signed -- does this explain its success?

#### Strategic Arms Limitation and Reduction Talks (SALT and START) of 1972, 1979, 1991, 1993. Limitations on growth rather than real reductions

#### Non-Strategic Bilateral Agreements - Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty - 1987.

##### Primary rule system: clear and specific. Eliminated ALL ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges 500-5,500 kilometers - completed destroying 2,692 missiles in 3 years, by June 1991

##### Information system -- verification

#### Non-Strategic Bilateral Agreements - Tactical Weapons

##### 1991 - Bush announced U.S. would unilaterally remove almost all tactical nuclear forces from deployment - to greatly reduce proliferation risks - Gorbachev matched this goal, but not fully implemented

#### Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty--SORT

##### SORT - 4 pages - signed 2002 - 1,700-2,200 DEPLOYED warheads

##### No verification

##### No destruction of warheads or delivery vehicles

##### "Balloon effects" == agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe may have simply lead to redeploying forces out of Europe but not destroying them.