Lecture #12  
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# WHEN do institutions get created?

## Agenda needs to be “set” by concerned actors

### Can be states but can be nongovernmental actors

### Why NGOs? Because “outside” actors that feel the costs/externalities of the “game” (PD, upstream/downstream problem, etc) have different incentives than those within the game, and incentives that make cooperation by others very attractive for them

#### Especially (though not only) on human rights issues

#### Slavery pushed by abolitionists, who mostly didn’t have slaves

#### Landmines pushed by activists, who don’t see themselves as benefitting from landmines but do feel that landmines are wrong.

#### Fair trade issues in trade negotiations, likely to be pushed by NGOs

### Sometimes states can be pushers as well BUT “when” depends

#### When changes in interests or perspectives of powerful states

##### US interests in Bretton Woods institutions

#### Moments of “crisis” or exogenous shocks that harm interests of powerful actors and make an existing problem “visible” and prompt calls for “we must do something”

##### 1948 Genocide Convention ***after Holocaust in Europe*** – but not after Armenian genocide of 1915 in Turkey

##### Basel I, II, and III banking regulations in response to banking problems

##### Oil spills off the coast ***of developed countries*** despite bigger spills off developing countries

#### When things get “bad enough”

# Human Rights and Transnational Activist Networks

## Why do some issues get on agenda but others don’t?

### Carpenter, Setting the Advocacy Agenda: Article about what gets on the agenda of HR

#### Nature of problems, e.g., identifiable actor, deliberate action, bodily harm

#### Resonate with larger norms: e.g., rights, similar weapons, etc.

#### Individuals championing an issue: problems are socially constructed by real people. Problems don’t just exist out there in the world, they get “created,” partly by how people talk about them and by gatekeeper organizations. “

## Examples:

### No action on children born of wartime rape but action on child soldiers and girls in war

### Landmines vs. cluster munitions

### There are “gatekeepers” who make a difference

### Advocates are “highly selective” about what they champion

## Definition: “A transnational advocacy network includes those actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services” (Keck and Sikkink, 89).

### Basically, think of it as NGOs working together across borders rather than individually within borders -- common goals, ways of talking about issues, sharing information and other resources.

### Not unlike a programmatic regime, in Young’s terms -- pooling resources to address a problem

## “What is novel in these networks is the ability of non-traditional international actors to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories, and to persuade, pressurize, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments” (Keck and Sikkink, 89).

## How they work

### Rights claims -- note the important reframing here simply by calling something a right -- moves away from logic of consequences to logic of appropriateness

### Boomerang processes: if ***your*** government is unresponsive, then work through TAN to get citizens of ***other*** countries to pressure ***their*** governments to put pressure on ***your*** government to take actions you couldn’t get it to take in first place.

### Tactic 1: Information politics - move info to where it will have most influence. Raising issues of desaparecidos in Argentina wasn’t useful, so move it to where it is. Importance of credibility - e.g., Amnesty International

### Tactic 2: Symbolic politics - evocative images -- “charismatic megafauna,” Greenpeace and whaling.

### Tactic 3: Leverage politics - weak NGOs use their influence with powerful actors (governments) to get those with more power to use their influence with governments or corporations who NGOs can’t directly influence

#### Material leverage -- logic of consequences. Issue linkage where powerful actors links money, trade, whatever to behavior after being pressured by TANs to do so.

#### Moral leverage -- logic of appropriateness. “mobilization of shame” -- show the world what someone did in a context in which certain behaviors are “just plain wrong”. Note, that this assumes a normative context in which certain acts are already accepted as “just plain wrong”.

### Tactic 4: Accountability politics - rhetorical entrapment -- get governments to say yes to things they can’t say no to and then get them to actually do those things they said they would. Make countries “be true to their word” or “walk the walk.”

### Framing and discourse: Fancy words --- what do they mean?

#### Core idea of framing -- that how we talk about things influences and is influenced by how we think about who we are (and who we want to be) and that, in turn, influences what we think we want to do and what we should do, and that in turn influences how we actually behave.

#### Important point: states are not the only ones in control of how we talk about things

#### Frame alignment and resonance -- using a particular frame because it links to other, already-accepted frames

#### Causal stories -- the framing must lead to someone being blamed and therefore responsible for taking action (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, 99). Being convincing requires not too complicated.

## Timing matters – windows of opportunity: “the issue fit the world views and beliefs of the Clinton administration, which was generally supportive of women's issues” (Joachim, 2003, 259).

## Why it matters

### “Shared norms often provide the foundation for more formal institutional processes of regional integration” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, 90).

### “promote norm convergence” that fosters integration

### “promote norm implementation” in terms of adopting new policies and monitoring compliance

### “changing the perceptions that both state and societal actors may have of their identities, interests and preferences, to transforming their discursive positions, and ultimately to changing procedures, policies and behaviour” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, 90).

## When will TANs emerge (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, 93).

### When domestic groups can’t get satisfaction from own government, so they seek outside channel to get satisfaction -- “‘boomerang’ pattern of influence characteristic of these networks”

### When ‘political entrepreneurs’ see networking as helping their goals

### When “international conferences and other forms of international contacts create arenas for forming and strengthening networks”

# Environmental problems

## Article was prompted by observation that all environmental problems are not alike and that, while many ***are*** Tragedies of the Commons, many are not.

## Basic argument:

### Symmetric externalities (Tragedies of the Commons): all states prefer cooperation to status quo so enforcement via issue-specific reciprocity. Coercion/incentives possible but unnecessary.

### Asymmetric externalities (upstream/downstream): worse distribution and enforcement problems so need broader institution in sense that must link problem to some other area of exchange, either incentives or coercion. And whether incentives or coercion depends on power balance between up and downstream states.

## Potential response strategies are three. BUT not all are available / viable for all problems

### Issue-specific reciprocity

### Coercion (negative linkage)

### Exchange (positive linkage)

## Regulating the Fur Seal Trade: Symmetric/Tragedy of the Commons but Options

### US and Russia: land sealing; Canada and Japan: ocean (“pelagic”) sealing

### Typical Tragedy of the Commons

### Options for addressing

#### Coercion (by US/Russia): possible but not in treaty

#### Reciprocity (common obligations): all 4 countries reduce

#### Exchange (positive incentives): C&J get 15% for free

## Regulating Pollution of the Rhine: Asymmetric and only 1 option

### France/Germany polluting Rhine; Dutch being polluted

### Typical upstream/downstream problem

### Options for addressing

#### Coercion (by Dutch): not possible (Dutch lack power)

#### Reciprocity (common obligations): France/Germany reject

#### Exchange (positive incentives): agreement only after cost-sharing proposed

### Risks of exchange: French “extortion”

### Institutional inertia: French, German, Swiss contribute to Dutch cleanup of IJsselmeer