Lecture #20
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# Introduction

## Read final exam

## Select examples based on the type of problem and then write about the problem, the efforts to solve that problem, and the effects and effectiveness of those efforts at solution. It will NOT be as good to pick an institution to evaluate, since that may make it less clear what the problem is. Start by describing and comparing two problems, then describe and compare institutions created to address them, and then discuss and compare how effective those efforts have been, using both counterfactual and goal achievement as your standards.

## See tables in various lectures that clarify interpretations

PROBLEM STRUCTURE

# Problem structure -- characteristics of the "pre-institutional" setting. How do things look before any international institution exists?

## Conflict/harmony/cooperation?: Do countries believe that other countries’ behaviors harm their interests?

### Deadlock game

## Actors: Who is involved? What actors are causing or affected by the problem? Who needs to be or could be brought in as relevant actors to fix the problem?

## Capacities/Power: Do countries "causing the problem" have opportunities and capacity to engage in "good" behavior?

### Positive Externality Plagued by Incapacity

## Incentives/Preferences: How do material consequences for the countries "causing the problem" depend on the behavior of other countries? Three possibilities, from Country R's perspective, if country C were to engage in good behavior:

### Upstream/Downstream Problem

### Coordination Problem

### Collaboration Problems

## Information/Knowledge: Are their unknown effects of their behaviors for those "causing the problem" that, if they knew about them, would make engaging in good behavior more attractive than bad behavior, regardless of what others do? Perpetrating country's behavior causes problems for other countries but also causes problems for itself which they are unaware of and which, if they knew about them, would cause them to stop the bad behavior.

### Epistemic/Knowledge Problem: related to knowledge of the consequences of one's behavior.

## Norms/Values: Are consequences not material in nature but other countries, even though they are not affected in material way, nonetheless consider it bad and illegitimate for the other country to behave that way? Are there judgments about what behaviors are appropriate for states to engage in and what behaviors it is not appropriate for states to engage in.

### Normative Problem

## Violation tolerance: How much can noncooperation be tolerated? For example, nuclear weapons vs. wargames

## Inherent transparency: How easily can noncooperation be hidden? For example, tariff rates vs. NTB

## Response incentives: How strong are incentives to respond to noncompliance? Arms control vs. HR

INSTITUTIONAL FORMATION AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

# Institutional formation

## Dependent variable: Does international institution exist or not? Institutions form when powerful actors responsible for a problem become convinced that a situation is suboptimal and that taking action to resolve it is in their interests

## Theoretical predictions (from hardest to negotiate to easiest to negotiate)

### Upstream/downstream problems: engagement problems -- getting upstream state to join

### Normative problems: engagement problems as well -- getting states one wants to influence to join

### Collaboration problems: distribution AND enforcement problems -- deciding who must adjust AND how to reassure and ensure compliance

### Positive externalities plagued by incapacity: engaging capable states and convincing that benefits of assistance outweigh costs

### Coordination problems: can involve hard distribution problems -- deciding who must adjust and pay the costs of adjusting

### Epistemic problems: coordinating and standardizing research efforts

# Institutional design

## Dependent variableS: What features exist in international institutions that are created? How does type of solution reached depend on type of problem being addressed. This is the “problem structure elements as IVs and institutional design as DVs” part of the course.

### Institutional type

#### Regulatory

#### Procedural

#### Programmatic

#### Generative

### Membership: Who needs to be involved to resolve problem? Limit it or make it inclusive

### Primary rule system characteristics

#### Ambitiousness and “Depth of cooperation”

#### Vague/specific and violation tolerance

#### Type of rules: proscriptions or prescriptions

#### Scope –broad/narrow (what’s in/what’s not)

#### Common vs. differentiated obligations

### Information system characteristics

#### Strength of information system

#### Type of information system based on enforcement/management distinction: self-reporting, reporting only, monitoring, on-site inspection

### Response system characteristics

#### Altering consequences – addressing incentive problems

#### Altering opportunities – addressing capacity and incapacity issues

#### Altering perceptions – addressing informational and normative issues

#### Reciprocity of response

#### Strictness of response – violation tolerance

INSTITUTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS

# Institutional effectiveness – did the institution achieve its objective?

## How would you know if the solution was effective or not?

### Counterfactuals AND

### Goal achievement.

## Where to look: How do we observe the effects of a treaty?

## How to look: How do we identify the "counterfactual" of the world without the treaty, or with the treaty but without the particular feature of the treaty (e.g., financial incentives)?

### Compare after to before for member countries

### Compare members to non-members after

### Compare regulated behavior of members to non-regulated behavior of members

## Is there a difference? What were the effects of each treaty?

## Is difference due to treaty? What other factors might have caused changes?

## Is the difference impressive? Was it an easy problem or a hard problem to resolve?

# Variation due to ***Problem Structure***

## Institutions facing HARDER problems are likely to be less effective

### Easy: coordination problems and epistemic problems

### Medium: upstream/downstream problems and positive externality plagued by incapacity

### Hard: collaboration and normative problems

## Number of actors: Fewer actors mean more effective institution {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 521}.

## Violation tolerance: LESS violation tolerance, more likely institution WILL be effective

## Inherent transparency variation: LESS inherent transparency, more likely institution will NOT be effective

## Response incentives: STRONGER response incentives, more likely institution WILL be effective

## Context: “International environment”

### More salience from international conferences, media – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 530}.

### NGO activism on issue – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 530}.

### Interplay with other institutions, including international financial institutions – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 530}.

# Variation due to ***Institutional Design***

## Institutional type:

### Procedural and programmatic institutions – MOST likely to be effective because can be flexible and responsive

### Regulatory: effectiveness depends on other aspects of institution

### Generative: least likely to be effective

## Membership: more states involved, LESS likely to be influential from monitoring and enforcement perspective but the more *committed* members there are, the more likely it will be to work according to Brown Weiss and Jacobson.

## Primary rule system

### Specificity: MORE specific rules lead to MORE effective institutions

### Common/Differentiated: Brown Weiss and Jacobson say it's not common vs. differentiated but perceived equity of rules. So, it depends on relationship of rules to the behavior causing the problem

## Information systems: Clearer and more specific information systems lead to MORE effective institutions

## Response systems:

### Facilitative institutions more likely than enforcement systems: Divergent hypotheses – enforcement vs. management school

### More clear and specific responses, of whatever type, lead to MORE effective institutions -- Incentives and/or sanctions; some type of response mechanism – more effective {Jacobson, 1998 #3970, 528}.

# Conclusions

## Course has been a very brief introduction and overview of realm of international organization

## Many differences across issue areas but... Many commonalities as well

## Things are changing but many things remain the same

## More room than ever for individuals to make a difference, either working in governments or working outside of them

## "If you don’t like the news, go out and make some of your own" Scoop Nitzger.