

PS320: International Organization

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Time: T-Th 8:30am-9:50am	Office Hours: PLC-921, Tues/Thurs 10:00-11:30, by signup and appt.
Course Website on Canvas	rmitchel@uoregon.edu ; Phone: 346-4880

COURSE DESCRIPTION

In this course, we will answer three main questions:

What types of **problems** do countries face in the international space? How does the type of problem influence the ease or difficulty of solving a problem and the type of solution countries select to fix it?

- What types of **solutions** do governments devise to address those problems? What determines why some solutions are successfully negotiated among countries while others are rejected?
- What determines why some of these solutions are **effective** and some are not? How can we accurately *assess* the effectiveness of international institutions at influencing state behavior?

We will examine these and related questions by studying international security, trade, human rights, and environment. We will study the roles that countries (“states”), non-state actors, information, and norms play in international relations. It is NOT a course describing the United Nations system or the bureaucratic structure of other international bureaucracies. It is a course on the “organization” of the international system rather than on international organizations. The course will study theories that explain why states succeed or fail at creating institutions for international governance and theories of which institutions are effective and under what conditions. You will develop a theoretical perspective on these questions and learn to see how problems in different issue areas are actually quite similar in terms of their political structure. The goal for the course is to help you improve your ability to analyze theories and their ability to explain particular patterns of facts, rather than simply learning the facts themselves.

REQUIRED TEXTS

Readings will be on the course Canvas site. The class is large but I will try to make discussion a valuable part of most class sessions. The reading load is quite heavy but doing the reading will be essential for interesting and enlightening class discussions.

- Young, Oran R. 1999. *Governance in world affairs*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Online readings: all readings other than Young are on Canvas and are designated as *Online Reading*.
- For required quizzes and some in-class surveys for assessing participation, you will need an I>clicker. You can buy/use your own or borrow one from a friend. Please register yours on Canvas.
- I encourage you to read *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, or another reliable newspaper daily. Read online, in the library or check the UO Bookstore.

EXPECTED LEARNING OUTCOMES

- Understand how the political structure of international problems varies across the issues of security, trade, human rights, and environment. Recognize the ways in which the power and incentives that lead states to engage in behaviors that cause collective problems make some problems harder to solve than others.
- Recognize the relationship between problem structure characteristics and the design of the international institutions that states create. Understand why states never include certain features in treaties to address certain problem types. Be able to distinguish certain types of treaties (regulatory, procedural, programmatic, and generative), when states are likely to adopt them, and the different elements of any international institution.
- Be able to assess whether an international institution has influenced state behavior and identify the key factors that make it more or less likely that an international institution will succeed in doing so.
- Demonstrate critical thinking and communication skills, including the use of counterfactuals, through midterms and a final exam. Show the ability to using empirical evidence to assess theoretical claims about the design and effectiveness of international institutions.

ESTIMATED STUDENT WORKLOAD

Student workload involves 120 hours for this 4-credit course. Time and percent for components are detailed below.

Class element	Percentage	Hours
Class attendance and participation	5%	30
Reading	0%	30
Plagiarism assignment: required but no points: Read Canvas assignment and my plagiarism policy (below), Come in with questions.	0%	1
Two quizzes: quizzes will end at 10:10 sharp. See dates below.	5% each (10% total)	2 each (prep) (4 total)
Two in-class midterms: See dates below.	25% each (50% total)	13 each (prep) (26 total)
Take-home final: due on Canvas by 8am by date on UO exam schedule.	35%	29

HOW GRADES WILL BE DETERMINED

Students will receive grades based on the following criteria:

- A+: if given at all, given to 1 or 2 students whose performance stood out as significantly stronger than all other students in the course
- A: all assignments completed in ways that demonstrate a particularly strong and nuanced understanding of almost all course concepts and the ability to clearly connect theories from the course to empirical evidence
- B: all assignments completed in ways that demonstrate solid understanding of most course concepts and the ability to adequately connect theories from the course to empirical evidence
- C: completed assignments demonstrate only a basic understanding of course concepts and/or one or more assignments missing
- D: missing many assignments and completed assignments demonstrate little understanding of material covered
- F: assignments completed account for less than 80% of total grade.

Expected distribution of grades: ~20% As, ~35% Bs, ~35% Cs, ~7% Ds, ~3% Fs.

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COURSE SCHEDULE AND ASSIGNMENTS

Introduction

Tues., Week 1: Introduction:

No readings. First day of class

Thurs., Week 1: International Organization: an introduction

Assignment 0 "Plagiarism" due by end of week 1: Complete online readings regarding plagiarism!

- Young, Ch. 1
- Krasner, S. D. 1982. Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables. *International Organization* 36(1): 185-205.
- Shanks, C., et al. 1996. Inertia and change in the constellation of international governmental organizations: 1981-1992. *International Organization* 50(4): 593-627.

Differences in the Structure of International Problems

Tues., Week 2: Problem Structure Theory: Part 1

- Young, Ch. 3
- Koremenos, B., et al. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization* 55(4): 761-799. *Read whole article but focus on INdependent Variables section: 773-780.*
- Stein, A. A. 1982. Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world. *International Organization* 36(2): 299-324.

Thurs., Week 2: Problem Structure Theory: Part 2

- Rittberger, V. and M. Zürn. 1990. Towards regulated anarchy in East-West relations: causes and consequences of East-West regimes. *International regimes in East-West politics*, edited by V. Rittberger: 9-63. London: Pinter. Read only 29-46.
- Underdal, A. 2002. One question, two answers. *Environmental regime effectiveness: confronting theory with evidence*, edited by E. L. Miles, A. Underdal, S. Andresen, J. Wettestad, J. B. Skjærseth and E. M. Carlin: 3-45. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Read only 15-23.

Tues., Week 3: Problem Structure: Security

Quiz #1 at beginning of class – quiz will end at 10:10 for all students, even those who show up late.

- Müller, H. 2013. Security cooperation. *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons: 607-634. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Thurs., Week 3: Problem Structure: International Political Economy

- Milner, H. 2013. International trade. *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons: 720-745. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage

Tues., Week 4: Problem Structure: Human Rights and Environment

- Schmitz, H. P. and K. Sikkink. 2013. International human rights. *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons: 827-851. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Mitchell, R. B. 2010. International politics and the environment (ch. 2). London: Sage Publications

Thurs., Week 4: Midterm Exam #1

Midterm Exam #1 in class

The Formation and Design of International Institutions

Tues., Week 5: Institutional Formation Theory: Part 1

- Young, Ch. 2
- Young, O. R. and G. Osherenko. 1993. Testing theories of regime formation: findings from a large collaborative research project. *Regime theory and international relations*, edited by V. Rittberger: 223-251. New York: Oxford University Press. Read only 223-238.
- Koremenos, B., C. Lipson and D. Snidal. 2001. The rational design of international institutions. *International Organization* 55(4): 761-799. *RE-read whole article but focus on DEpendent Variables section (768-773) AND Conjectures section (780-796).*

Thurs., Week 5: Institutional Formation Theory (Part 2) and Security

- Koremenos, B., et al. 2001. Rational design: looking back to move forward. *International Organization* 55(4): 1051-1082.

- Hemmer, C. and P. J. Katzenstein. 2002. Why is there no NATO in Asia? collective identity, regionalism, and the origins of multilateralism. *International Organization* 56(3): 575-607.

Tues., Week 6: Institutional Formation: Trade and the European Union

Quiz #2 at beginning of class – quiz will end at 10:10 for all students, even those who show up late.

- Kucik, J. and E. Reinhardt. 2008. Does flexibility promote cooperation? an application to the global trade regime. *International Organization* 62(3): 477–505.
- Parsons, C. 2010. Revisiting the Single European Act and the common wisdom on globalization. *Comparative Political Studies* 43(6): 706-734.
- Garrett, G. 1992. International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal market. *International Organization* 46(2): 533-60.

Thurs., Week 6: Institutional Formation: Human Rights and Environment

- Carpenter, R. C. 2007. Setting the advocacy agenda: theorizing issue emergence and nonemergence in transnational advocacy networks. *International Studies Quarterly* 51(1): 99-120.
- Mitchell, R. B. and P. Keilbach. 2001. Reciprocity, coercion, or exchange: symmetry, asymmetry and power in institutional design. *International Organization* 55(4): 891-917.

Tues., Week 7: Midterm Exam #2

Midterm Exam #2

The Effects and Effectiveness of International Institutions

Thurs., Week 7: Institutional Effectiveness Theory

- Young, Ch. 4 AND Ch. 5
- Mitchell, R. B. 2010. International politics and the environment (ch. 6). London: Sage Publications
- Jacobson, H. K. and E. Brown Weiss. 1998. Assessing the record and designing strategies to engage countries. *Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international environmental accords*, edited by E. Brown Weiss and H. K. Jacobson: 511-554. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

Tues., Week 8: Institutional Effectiveness: Security and Trade

- **Syria's Chemical Weapons:** Read the following websites and think about the influence of international institutions on Syria's destruction of its chemical weapons
 - Various. 2014. Destruction of Syria's chemical weapons. *Wikipedia*. 20 August 2014 (accessed: 1 September 2014)
 - U.S. Department of State. 2014. Framework for elimination of Syrian chemical weapons. *U.S. Department of State*. 14 September 2013 (accessed: 1 September 2014)
 - Rappeport, A. 2014. Syria's chemical arsenal fully destroyed, U.S. says. *New York Times*. 1 September 2014 (accessed: 18 August 2014)
- Goldstein, J. L., et al. 2007. Institutions in international relations: understanding the effects of the GATT and the WTO on world trade. *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67. Read only 37-47 and 63-64.

Thurs., Week 8: Institutional Effectiveness: Human Rights and Migration

- Lahav, G. and S. Lavenex. 2013. International migration. *Handbook of International Relations, 2nd ed.*, edited by W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons: 746-774. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Neumayer, E. 2005. Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(6): 925-953.

Tues., Week 9: Institutional Effectiveness: Environment

- Bernauer, T. and T. Siegfried. 2008. On cooperation, compliance and performance in international water management, with an empirical application to the Syr Darya basin. *Global Governance* 14(4): 479-501.

Thurs., Week 9:

Thanksgiving Break -- No Class

Conclusions

Tues., Week 10: Institutional Effectiveness: Review

- Young, Ch. 6 AND 7

Thurs., Week 10: Review of Class Theory and Substance and "The Future of Global Governance"

- Young, Ch. 8
- Review all previous class readings and come to class with questions

Take-Home Final Exam

Submit via Canvas no later than 8am on date designated on University final exam schedule.

COURSE POLICIES

Late assignments

Help me help you pass the course by turning in all assignments on time. Late assignments lose 2 points/day: assignments received before midnight of the 1st day after being due lose 2 of 100 points, before midnight of the 2nd day 4 points, etc. Turn in all assignments, even if late. Missing ANY assignment makes passing this course difficult.

Grade complaints

Contested grades will first be read by a second GTF. If the second GTF assigns the same grade, no grade change will occur. If the second GTF assigns either a higher or lower grade, the professor will read the assignment and independently assign the final grade, which can be either higher or lower.

Academic Integrity, Plagiarism, Fabrication, Cheating, and Misconduct:

By enrolling in this course, you agree to abide by the University's Student Conduct Code. You must read the three webpages linked on Canvas for the Plagiarism Assignment. Understanding these documents is a REQUIREMENT that you MUST complete by the end of week 1. Everything in your assignments must be your own work. Neither ignorance of these policies nor the lack of an intention to cheat or plagiarize will be considered a legitimate defense. Raise questions you have with the professor before problems arise. I will flunk all students who plagiarize and will report them to University authorities. Unfortunately, I have done so two or three times in the past few years.

Creating an environment conducive to learning

Civility and tolerance: My primary goal as a faculty member is to create an inclusive learning environment in which *everyone* feels safe to express their views, whatever they may be, so long as they do so in ways that are respectful of others. In light of the divisions that became visible in the 2016 election, I seek to create a learning environment in which those who voted for our current President and those who did not can BOTH feel free to express their political opinions. One cannot identify a person's political views by race, religion, attire, gender, favorite music, or type of skateboard: in 2016, at least 1 in 10 (and often 3 in 10) of *every demographic group* voted differently than the rest of that group <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html>

Being the faculty member for a class gives one considerable power (directly over grades and in more subtle ways). Therefore, I will try to be cautious in how I express my views and in how I respond to students expressing theirs. I will try my best to keep my own political biases in check so as to help everyone in the class feel safe expressing their views, regardless of which side of the political aisle they stand on. My biases will come through at points – I apologize for that and *encourage you to call me out* (in a respectful way) when they do. I invite each of you to express your political views, whatever they may be, in a way that is respectful of all people, whether they are in our classroom or not. I encourage you to disagree with me and to challenge me to separate relatively-objective theories and facts from more-subjective values. In my view, democracy works when differences of opinion are expressed with enough clarity and respect that I change my mind and, perhaps, I also change the minds of others. *I ask for your help in creating a learning environment in which mutual and inclusive respect extends to all people regardless of who they are or what their political views are, so long as those views are expressed respectfully.*

Students with disabilities:

Both I as a professor and the University of Oregon are committed to creating inclusive learning environments. Please notify me if any aspects of my instruction methods or course design result in barriers to your participation. If you have a preferred gender pronoun, please let me know what it is. If you have a disability, I encourage you to contact Accessible Education Center in 164 Oregon Hall at 346-1155 or uoaec@uoregon.edu If you have already been in contact with Accessible Education Center and have a notification letter, please provide me with a statement from Accessible Education Center during the first week of class so that we can make appropriate arrangements. University policy requires that students present a notification letter from AEC to receive testing accommodations (see <http://aec.uoregon.edu/students/current.html>).

Prohibited Discrimination and Harassment Reporting

I personally strongly support the University's policy on discrimination and harassment, as reflected in the following statement from the University of Oregon at <https://titleix.uoregon.edu/syllabus> -- *all referenced materials can be accessed from that website.*

I am a Student Directed Employee. For information about my reporting obligations as an employee, please see <https://titleix.uoregon.edu/employee-reporting-obligations> Students experiencing any form of prohibited discrimination or harassment, including sex or gender based violence, may seek information on <https://safe.uoregon.edu> <https://respect.uoregon.edu> <https://titleix.uoregon.edu>, or <https://aaeo.uoregon.edu> or contact the non-confidential Title IX office (541-346-8136), Office of Civil Rights Compliance office (541-346-3123), or Dean of Students offices (541-346-3216), or call the 24-7 hotline 541-346-SAFE for help.

Any student who has experienced sexual assault, relationship violence, sex or gender-based bullying, stalking, and/or sexual harassment may seek resources and help at <https://safe.uoregon.edu>. To get help by phone, a student can also call either the UO's 24-hour hotline at 541-346-7244 [SAFE], or the non-confidential Title IX Coordinator at 541-346-8136. From the SAFE website, students may also connect to Callisto, a confidential, third-party reporting site that is not a part of the university.

Students experiencing any other form of prohibited discrimination or harassment can find information at <https://respect.uoregon.edu> or <https://aaeo.uoregon.edu> or contact the non-confidential AAEO office at 541-346-3123 or the Dean of Students Office at 541-346-3216 for help. As UO policy has different reporting requirements based on the nature of the reported harassment or discrimination, additional information about reporting requirements for discrimination or harassment unrelated to sexual assault, relationship violence, sex or gender based bullying, stalking, and/or sexual harassment is available at Discrimination & Harassment. Specific details about confidentiality of information and reporting obligations of employees can be found at <https://titleix.uoregon.edu>. *Mandatory Reporting of Child Abuse:* UO employees, including faculty, staff, and GEs, are mandatory reporters of child abuse. This statement is to advise you that your disclosure of information about child abuse to a UO employee may trigger the UO employee's duty to report that information to the designated authorities. Please refer to the following links for detailed information about mandatory reporting at <https://hr.uoregon.edu/policies-leaves/general-information/mandatory-reporting-child-abuse-and-neglect>

SUPPORTING MATERIAL

Additional OPTIONAL Readings

Below are additional readings that I have not assigned for the class but that interested students may want to read. They also provide a place for students to start (and include in) their research. Also, ANY articles in the journals: *International Organization*, *International Studies Quarterly*, *World Politics*, or *International Studies Perspectives* are great places to start doing further research on international organization and the topics covered in this course. These are NOT available online (despite below) but are available via <http://libweb.uoregon.edu/>

- Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal. 1998. Why states act through formal international organizations. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(1): 3-32 (read pages 3-23 only).
- Abbott, K. W. and D. Snidal. 2000. Hard and soft law in international governance. *International Organization* 54(3): 421-456.
- Allee, T. L. and C. Peinhardt. 2011. Contingent credibility: the impact of investment treaty violations on foreign direct investment. *International Organization* 65(3): 401-432.
- Allee, T. L. and J. E. Scalera. 2012. The divergent effects of joining international organizations: trade gains and the rigors of WTO accession. *International Organization* 66(2): 243-276.
- Alter, K. J. 1998. Who are the "masters of the treaty?" European governments and the European Court of Justice. *International Organization* 52(1): 121-147.
- Barnett, M. N. and M. Finnemore. 1999. The politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations. *International Organization* 53(4): 699-732.
- Bernauer, T. 2002. Explaining success and failure in international river management. *Aquatic Sciences* 64(1): 1-19.
- Carpenter, C., et al. 2014. Explaining the advocacy agenda: insights from the human security network. *International Organization* 68(02): 449-470.
- Cao, X. and A. Prakash. 2010. Trade competition and domestic pollution: a panel study, 1980-2003. *International Organization* 64(3): 481-503.
- Dai, X. 2005. Why comply? the domestic constituency mechanism. *International Organization* 59(2): 363-398. Read only 363-366 and 374-389.
- Donno, D. 2010. Who is punished? Regional intergovernmental organizations and the enforcement of democratic norms. *International Organization* 64(4): 593-626.
- Efrat, A. 2010. Toward internationally regulated goods: controlling the trade in small arms and light weapons. *International Organization* 64(1): 97-131.
- Gilligan, M. J. 2004. Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international multilateral agreements? *International Organization* 58(3): 459-484.
- Goldstein, J. L., D. Rivers and M. Tomz. 2007. Institutions in international relations: understanding the effects of the GATT and the WTO on world trade. *International Organization* 61(1): 37-67. Read only 37-47 and 63-64.
- Grieco, J. M. 1995. The Maastricht Treaty, economic and monetary union and the neo-realist research programme. *Review of International Studies* 21(1): 21-40.
- Hafner-Burton, E. M., et al. 2011. Emergency and escape: explaining derogations from human rights treaties. *International Organization* 65(4): 673-707.
- Hawkins, D. G. 2004. Explaining costly international institutions: persuasion and enforceable human rights norms. *International Studies Quarterly* 48(4): 779-804
- Kratochwil, F. and J. G. Ruggie. 1986. International organization: a state of the art on the art of the state. *International Organization* 40(4): 753-775.
- McLean, E. V. and R. W. Stone. 2012. The Kyoto Protocol: two-level bargaining and European integration. *International Studies Quarterly* 56(1): 99-113.
- Mitchell, R. B. 1994. Regime design matters: intentional oil pollution and treaty compliance. *International Organization* 48(3): 425-458.
- Moravcsik, A. 2000. The origins of human rights regimes: democratic delegation in postwar Europe. *International Organization* 54(2): 217-252.
- Morrow, J. D. 1994. Modeling the forms of international cooperation: distribution versus information. *International Organization* 48(3): 387-423.

- Nielson, D. L. and M. J. Tierney. 2003. Delegation to international organizations: agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. *International Organization* 57(2): 241-276.
- Schneider, C. J. 2011. Weak states and institutionalized bargaining: power in international organizations. *International Organization* 55(2): 331-355.
- Stinnett, D. M., et al. 2011. Complying by denying: explaining why states develop nonproliferation export controls. *International Studies Perspectives* 12(3): 308-326.
- Thompson, A. 2006. Coercion through IOs: the Security Council and the logic of information transmission. *International Organization* 60(1): 1-34.