Lecture 7  
23 April 2019  
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# Introduction

# Three types of state interaction

## Conflict: independent decision-making produces bad outcomes

## Harmony: independent decision-making produces good outcomes. "a situation in which actors' policies (pursued in their own self-interests without regard to others) automatically facilitate the attainment of others' objectives" (Keohane, After Hegemony, 1986, 200-201)

## Cooperation: interdependent decision-making produces good outcomes. " when the policies followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination" (1986:199).

# Implications of Theory for outcomes we will observe in IR.

## **Likelihood of cooperation:**

### Realism: Cooperation among states unlikely, just strategic interaction. Harmony or Coercion, not cooperation. Unlikely because states concerned about relative gains and short-term interests.

### Institutionalism: TRUE Cooperation among states possible. More likely when states concerned about absolute gains, low concerns about security, and long-term benefits exceed short-term costs.

### Disenfranchised theory: Cooperation among states unlikely to benefit disenfranchised individuals. Cooperation will tend to reinforce existing gendered/ethnic/religious power structures.

## **Conditions/type of cooperation:** When will we see international cooperation and international treaties?

### Realism: expect treaties when

#### "Codify" existing / expected future behavior; nukes on seabed, moon.

#### Hegemonic states force other states to cooperate: Warsaw Pact.

#### Coordination games, few distributional effects: airplane traffic; diplomatic immunity.

### Institutionalism expect treaties when

#### Significant and reciprocal interdependence

#### Relative gains are LOW concern

#### Treaty designs can overcome obstacles to cooperation

### Disenfranchised theory expect treaties when

#### Structure and “dialogue” reflects norms rather than interests

#### Material sources of power become less important

#### Still, most treaties will reinforce interests of powerful actors ACROSS states (men, dominant races and religions)

# Structural realism of Waltz:

## Structure vs. unit level of analysis. Explaining conflict requires attention to international level factors, not state-level or human-level factors. Structure is the arrangement of the parts of a system.

## ***Structure forms a wedge between intentions and outcomes***

### In PD, structure created by prosecuting attorney; in international relations, structure created by anarchy of international system. In both cases, structures prevent actors from getting what they want

### Two factors of concern to Waltz:

#### Ordering principle: Anarchy/self-help. Waltz focuses on self-help nature of system. In absence of government, with no constraints on use of force, actors must rely on selves for security.

#### Relative capabilities = distribution of power.

#### All states must undertake same tasks of providing for survival and protection from attack. No state wants to do that, but system's structure forces them to.

### Structure, not characteristics of states, dictates outcomes. Structure limits cooperation and specialization/interdependence that flow from cooperation in 2 ways:

#### Absence of government to protect against attack by others --> self-help system --> concern for survival --> relative gains concern --> failure to choose to cooperate --> little interdependence. Self-help makes states care more about ensuring survival than increasing welfare.

#### Worried about dependence directly. State worries about interdependence because the other state may take advantage of it.

### Concern with relative gains rather than absolute gains says Grieco. A hypothetical example from trade demonstrating why there won’t be a trade agreement

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Country A** | **Country B** |
| **No trade** | 100M GDP | 100M GDP |
| **Trade agreement (year 1)** | 120M GDP | 130M GDP |
| **Trade pact (year 2)** | 110M GDP + 100 tanks | 110M GDP + 200 tanks |
| **War by B on A (year 3)** |  |  |
| **Trade pact (year 4)** | 0M GDP + 0 tanks | 220M GDP + 100 tanks |

### The main goal of states is to stay in the game. They are “positional” not “atomistic” -- i.e., they are concerned with relative gains (gains relative to other states) not absolute gains (gains relative to their own position in the previous time period).

## Anarchic, self-help nature of international system forces all states to seek power as means of preserving sovereignty and surviving. Regardless of cultural, moral, social or ethnic differences states seek their own survival, see force as useful and effective, and that international system does not impose constraints on use of force other than those imposed by unequal power. Thus, a state need only worry about accurately calculating whether, given the current distribution of power in the international system and its power relative to its opponent, the use of force will increase its power and likelihood of survival or decrease it.

### Nature of structural argument: why different actors with different motives, different characteristics and otherwise different nonetheless forced to behave the same. Elections and changes in leaders don't make a difference.

### Different than Thucydides/Morgenthau's argument based in human nature. Morgenthau declares that realism believes that international politics "is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature" (1993, 4). What would Waltz's response to this be, even though both are realists?

### Good because simple theory. Realism has parsimony or is parsimonious. Ockham’s razor: The simpler of two competing theories is preferable. Simple but works pretty well: E.g., Clinton's defense budget not much different from Bush's; Benazir Bhutto continues nuclear program.

## Structure as a wedge between intentions and outcomes

### Positive example of how structure can be a wedge: Bill Gates and hardware manufacturers examples.

### Negative examples: Fire in movie theater; Yosemite Valley hiking - no rules regarding who can go; Tobacco advertising story; whaling example; war.

### Intentions do not lead to desired outcomes because of structure of system. Note that this is different than saying that we don't always get what we want in the world. Its saying that we don't even come close to getting what we want because structure prevents us from doing so.

# Prisoner's Dilemma

## The puzzle: Leaders of nations are not stupid so why do they engage in war and arms races even though they don't want to? Why does it make sense for nations to build arms and seek greater military power when they know that doing so will only increase the insecurity of other nations, causing them to build more arms, in the long run leading to the expenditure of money but no greater security? How can two nations that both want peace and security create conditions that make war occur, or at least very likely?

## The explanation: Prisoners' Dilemma as metaphor for *how “structure” gives each country incentives that lead them to behave in ways that make them worse off than they would be if they cooperated*.

## Example: US/Soviet arms race in the 1950s through 1970s.

### Usual metaphor involves drug dealers – you can read it anywhere.

### **Actors**: US and Soviets

### **Strategies**: choices actors have.

#### “Increase nuclear weapons”

#### “Reduce nuclear weapons”

### **Outcomes/payoffs**:

#### “I won” arms race with high costs but increased security for US: outcome if United States increases nukes and Soviet Union doesn't; **Score for US 500**

#### “Arms control” with low costs and no loss in security for either country: outcome if both United States and Soviet Union decrease nukes. **Score for US 100**

#### “Stalemate” arms race with high costs but no increase in security for either country: outcome if both United States and Soviet Union increases nukes; **Score for US -200**

#### “They won” arms race with lower costs and decreased security for US: outcome if Soviet Union increases nukes and United States doesn't; **Score for US -1000**.

### **Solving the dilemma:** what strategies will states choose, what are the outcomes, and what are the payoffs? Look at from United States’ point of view.

#### Assume Soviet Union INCREASES nuclear weapons. If United States REDUCES nuclear weapons, buil, 10 years; if confesses 5 years, so United States definitely better off confessing.

#### Assume Soviet Union silent. If United States silent, 1 year; if confesses no time at all, so again United States definitely better off confessing.

#### Structure means that United States always better off confessing regardless of Soviet Union. Same true for Soviet Union. So, even though both prefer to be in the upper left hand corner, they end up confessing and land in the lower right hand one, doing five years apiece.

UNITED STATES’ PERSPECTIVE:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Soviet Union | |
| Reduce nukes | Increase nukes |
| United States | Reduce nukes | US no less secure (100) | US overrun (-1000) |
| Increase nukes | US super-secure (500) | US insecure and poor (-200) |

SOVIET UNION’S PERSPECTIVE:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Soviet Union | |
| Reduce nukes | Increase nukes |
| United States | Reduce nukes | Soviets no less secure (100) | Soviets super-secure (500) |
| Increase nukes | Soviets overrun (-1000) | Soviets insecure and poor (-200) |


OVERALL GAME:

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | | Soviet Union | |
| Reduce nukes | Increase nukes |
| United States | Reduce nukes | Soviets no less secure (100)  US no less secure (100) | Soviets super-secure (500)  US overrun (-1000) |
| Increase nukes | Soviets overrun (-1000)  US super-secure (500) | Soviets insecure and poor (-200)  US insecure and poor (-200) |

## Captures essence of security dilemma: Peloponnesian War. Sparta and Athen's both spend more on armaments. If both had been satisfied with international status, could have had peace and spent less. If either one, however, spent more money on weapons without the other doing so, they could expect to gain control over the others territory with little or no real contest. But, not unlike the prisoners, they both spent more on weapons and went into a costly arms race and the constant threat of war for decades.

## Security dilemma arises even if we don't assume nations and leaders are evil and war-mongerers. Arises from structure of self-help international system with lack of trust, miscommunication and misperception create perceived threats to that security. Obviously, some countries can trust one another. Thus, Australia and New Zealand or the U.S. and Canada have not been stuck in security dilemmas. Why?

# The Security Dilemma



## No state can be sure another state's intentions are peaceful or will remain so, so each seeks to maintain power for defense. Other states can not be sure this power will not be used for an offensive attack and therefore builds up its power for defense. Thus, the states continually match the power-seeking efforts of the other, with both sides feeling no more secure but with far less resources. In a spiral that can produce both arms races and the threat or actuality of war:

### Country A, not trusting country B, acquires power for its own defense.

### Country B, not trusting A, sees A's power as, at least, potentially, for aggressive, offensive, purposes.

### B therefore seeks more power to strengthen its own defense.

### A sees B's actions, interprets them as offensive, and takes it as strictly confirmation of its original distrust of B. It therefore starts the whole cycle over again.

## Four causes of the dilemma or at least “contributors to” the dilemma:

### **Anarchic/self-help structure of international system**. Each state depends on self for survival.

### **Lack of trust.** Fear breeds lack of trust. Plenty of evidence that other states should not be trusted. Bosnia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Vietnam, Afghanistan, all have been invaded. Even if trust country today, may not trust tomorrow. Winston Churchill: "no permanent alliances, only permanent interests."

### **Misperception and miscommunication.** Sovereignty and national pride lead to view of other countries as threatening and misperception of motives. Barriers of language and culture. U.S. in Gulf War didn’t understand why Iraqis did what they did. Cuban missile crisis.

### **Ambiguity regarding offense/defense of military forces and actions**. Athenian wall. Star Wars. Intentions vs. capabilities. Best to make worst case assumptions. Costs of being overrun if wrongly assume good intentions are worse than costs of spending too much on defense if wrongly assume bad intentions.

## Can countries escape the Security Dilemma?

### When defensive weapons look different than offensive

### When easier to defend then attack: No incentive to escalate if you know other has advantage

### Depends on technology and geography - e.g., nuclear missiles on submarines: Soviets used Eastern Europe; DMZs

# Security Dilemma and Prisoner’s Dilemma

## ***Relative*** gains concerns – if face strong relative gains concerns than likely that there is no possibility of cooperation. This would be the realist take.

## Role of trust – if trust is lacking than likely to have strong relative gains concerns

## Even when ONLY ***absolute*** gains are involved cooperation may be difficult

## Role of iteration

## Role of external sanctions – targeting problem

## Multiple actors problem

## Role of information

## Role of diffuse reciprocity

## How many situations are really like this? Most, not many, all, none? Empirical question

### Don’t play the game

### What gets defined as cooperation or defection